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 Much of Western society is engaging with complex ideas and events such as 
multiculturalism, immigration, assimilation, and terrorism. The United Kingdom (UK) 
and the United States (US) are relevant to this larger discussion considering the 2016 
finalization of the ‘Brexit’ decision to leave the European Union and the recent travel 
restriction policies in the US targeting some countries with Islam as majority religious 
affiliation. Given these events, my larger research question addresses how majority 
populations view minority groups. Several studies have provided a view of how Muslims 
in the West form their own identities (Hopkins, 2011; Modood & Ahmad, 2007; Peek et 
al., 2005), however there is very little research on how Muslims are perceived as a group 
by majority non-Muslim populations (Fischer et al., 2007; Gerges, 2003). The purpose of 
this comparative research project is to gain an understanding of white-identifying 
populations’ perceptions of Muslims in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
(US) using qualitative and quantitative ethnographic methodologies. 
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 An elderly woman running a food truck swathed in red and green tree lights 
handed me an aluminum bowl of stew through the serving window. The scent of beef hit 
the chilled wind, along with the shouts of nearby protesters demanding that the United 
Kingdom stem the flow of immigrants into the country. It was 2016 and I was at the 
Christmas market in Nottingham, a fashionable British town filled with luxury boutiques, 
designer shops, and approximately twenty mosques. Walking further into the fold of 
chocolate crafts, mittens, and giant snowmen, I passed an area sectioned off with waist-
high plastic barriers filled with impassioned Brits. Some waved posters that reminded us 
of Christ’s timely importance, others that displayed strongly-worded sentiments towards 
Egypt and other predominantly Muslim countries. Along the cobbled streets, a few 
pedestrians stopped to engage with the protesters. Some donated money. I eventually 
walked away from the market to the tune of their shouting, their inflammatory sign 
waving, and the overwhelming loudspeaker Christmas music. Five months post-Brexit, 
the issues it brought to the attention of the public were still hitting home.  
* * * 
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Western consciousness is inundated with reminders of recent terrorism, which is 
complicated further by complex ideas like immigration, multiculturalism, and 
assimilation. These concepts and events have become interwoven and difficult to tease 
apart alongside the global rise of populist movements (Buijs & Rath, 2006). Nationalism 
and xenophobia have become a prominent facet of modern politics. Knowledge and 
understanding of the ‘other’ is lacking. Muslim people living in the West exist in a 
liminal space between all of these points of contention and have become a focus of their 
debate. 
Often the very possibility of a Muslim person existing within the space of the 
West is questioned. For hundreds of years Islam has been portrayed as contradictory to 
Western values, oppressive, savage, and violent in Orientalist historical accounts as well 
as fictional and journalistic media (Gerges, 2003; Listhaug & Strabac, 2008; Said, 1977; 
Shaheen, 2003). However, modern views of Muslims are affected by historical aspects, 
but also new cultural aspects. There are everyday acts of racism and prejudice towards 
this group and other minorities that feed into a Western, Christian, and colonialist 
hegemony that is rooted in this history. 
It should be noted that ‘Muslim’ is an identity category related to religious 
affiliation, not a race. However, it is useful to utilize frameworks that examine racial 
prejudice in understanding bias against Muslim religious minority groups. Muslims are 
often racialized and conflated with other minority groups. It should also be noted that 
white populations in the West have most likely been exposed to Muslim populations less 
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often than black populations, though this will vary regionally. This could result in greater 
prevalence of symbolic racism expressed towards Muslims (Kinder & Sears, 1981). 
Although there is a great deal of research on how Muslims form their own 
identities, there is a lack of nuanced research concerning how non-Muslim majority 
populations view the group (Fischer et al., 2007; Gerges, 2003; Hopkins, 2011; Modood 
& Ahmad, 2007; Peek et al., 2005). This thesis pursues a better understanding of how 
Muslims are perceived by majority populations in the West during a time of increased 
multiculturalism and reactionarism.  
Utilizing anthropological and perceptual-based methodologies, this research 
captured a unique view of how Muslim populations are identified and how they are 
characterized in the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US). The UK and the US 
are relevant to this larger discussion considering the recent ‘Brexit’1 decision to leave the 
European Union and the recent travel restriction policies in the US targeting some 
countries with Islam as majority religious affiliation. This thesis consists of five chapters: 
an introduction, including a literature review and a background on the history and current 
status of Islam in the two studied areas; a methods section; a results section; a discussion; 
and a conclusion with recommendations for future policy and research.  
 
Literature Review 
Islam in the West 
                                                          
1 Brexit, or the “British exit from the European Union (EU),” is a complex, still-pending decision by the 
United Kingdom to remove itself from the rules and restrictions as well as benefits of the EU. There were 
a number of arguments made for this exit, including the economic. The most salient arguments were 
perhaps focused on the cultural saturation of Britain with those who are not British as presented by UKIP. 
4 
 
 The relationship between Islam and Western society is complex and conflict-
filled. The root of this conflict and how far into the past it extends is controversial. While 
9/11, the infamous attacks on the World Trade Center that occurred on September 11, 
2001, is more recently understood to be the origin for the West’s clash with Islam, anti-
Muslim prejudice was strong prior to this terrorist event in the US (Listhaug & Strabac, 
2008). The word “Islamophobia” was created in 1997 in Britain as part of discourse 
concerning the victimization of Muslims (Cesari, 2004). Since scholarship on Islam is 
often a response to negative events, attitudes, or beliefs, these works mention general 
atmospheres of Islamophobia or misrepresentations of Islam rather than offering an 
alternative (Cesari, 2004). Some even argue that the negative views of Muslims common 
throughout Europe are rooted in the first Crusade and its opposition of Islam and 
Christianity (Husain & O’Brien, 2000).  
Much of the literature refers to a political and ideological schism between the East 
and West, especially as a function of Islam and Christianity. This is depicted as a sort of 
epic, destined battle, going back to the Crusades. While many historians would refer to 
this as a clash of civilizations, Aga Khan and Asani (2009) refer to this as “the clash of 
ignorances” instead. This encapsulates the situation in a more precise way. They argue 
that the accumulation of misconceptions and misunderstandings about different cultures 
has led to fear of the other.  
From a theoretical perspective, it is also important here to contextualize the term 
‘Other’, which is often employed in literature on Orientalism, Islam, and the East in 
general. There is a long history of this term being used in order to establish the West as 
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an ingroup versus the East as an outgroup (Adamson, 2011). For example, during their 
first contact with Eastern countries and the subjugation of those peoples through the 
process of colonialization, Westerners formed their own identity out of this fabrication of 
difference and justification for their actions (Saeed, 2017; Said, 1977). The perception 
became that colonizers were then white, civilized, and moral, and the colonies were non-
white, savage, and violent. While racism has since dramatically changed in its expression 
and justification, much of this dichotomous view persists in modern discourse and in the 
subconscious (Belton, 2002; Griffiths, 2002; Rony, 1996). ‘Other’ has for years implied 
alienness, immorality, cultural inferiority, and, it has been argued, still does today (Saeed, 
2007). 
In fact, the concept of a “clash of civilizations” may contribute to a negative 
stereotypical narrative in itself. Strabac and Listhaug (2008) delineated two broad 
categories of negative stereotypes of Islam of which “the clash of civilizations” is the 
first. It centers around the supposed political and military threat of Islam (Strabac & 
Listhaug, 2008). The second category surrounds the real or imagined cultural facets of 
Islam and the Muslim community that are perceived as being contradictory to the 
Western value system, especially when it concerns gender inequality (Strabac & 
Listhaug, 2008).  
 The perception of Islam as an impending threat is likely a function of the 
subsumption of Muslims into other marginalized groups, the portrayal of Islam as violent 
in fictional and journalistic media, and the long history of portrayals of Eastern countries 
as savage (Gerges, 2003; Listhaug & Strabac, 2008; Said, 1977; Shaheen, 2003). 
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Terrorism in modern society has simply reified past power structures and stereotypes. As 
Cesari states, there is “a widespread tendency to conflate Islam as an international 
political force with the ordinary Muslims living as a minority population in the countries 
of the West” (2004, p. 2). 9/11 is often seen as the event that initially led to the 
politicization of 'Muslim' as an identity. However, many events prior to 9/11 contributed 
greatly to changes in how Muslims are perceived in the West. Examples include the 
Iranian revolution, the Rushdie affair, the Gulf War, and the Palestinian intifada 
(Adamson, 2011; Buijs & Rath, 2006). Many events following 9/11 have changed the 
political and social landscape as well, including the 7/7 bombings in the UK that were 
particularly relevant to this research in participant interviews. 
 Not only are individual Muslims across the world conflated with a broader 
Islamic international political force, but they are also conflated with various other 
minority groups (Cesari, 2004). This conflation is evident in the large number of violent 
events that have occurred in both the US and UK aimed at harming minority victims 
(Sikhs, Jewish populations, Indian populations, and so on) perceived as being Muslim 
who in fact were not (Batchelor, 2018; McGreal, 2012; Mishra, 2017; Osborne, 2017; 
Prendergast, 2017; Suri & Wu, 2017). For example, in the UK, a Brazilian man the police 
had mistaken for a Muslim extremist who had attacked London was shot seven times 
(BBC, 2005; Sherriff, 2015).   
In the West, Muslims are often perceived as being alien, or immigrants from 
another country. Immigrant prejudice is often closely linked to perceived threat 
(economic, etc.) and as a result of their subsumption, anti-Muslim prejudice may be 
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linked to it as well. When studying prejudice against Muslims, it is important to consider 
results from studies of immigrant prejudice while keeping in mind that these are often 
different groups. Hartman, Newman, and Scott (2014) proposed three categories for the 
most common concerns of anti-immigrant groups in America. These include: (1) whether 
illegal immigrants abide by their new country’s laws, (2) the threat of immigrants to 
material resources and wealth, and (3) the threat of immigrants to American culture. 
These concerns mirror those negative stereotypes of Muslims outlined by Strabac and 
Listhaug (2008) and extend to the rest of Western society. 
Muslims are perhaps most often misconstrued as all being of Arab background, 
and Arabs are misconstrued as all being Muslim. In actuality, 85% of Muslims in the 
world are not Arab (Schaefer, 2010). Shaheen (2003) argues that movies and other media 
can be seen as taking much of the blame for this incorrect stereotype. Despite reality, the 
repetition of the presentation of Arabs and Muslims as being the same group has led to 
the attribution of imagined and real characteristics of Arabs to Muslims in the public 
mind (Shaheen, 2003). Movies, the news, and other sources of information and popular 
culture contribute greatly to the politicization of Islam and the formation of negative 
stereotypes (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Asani, 2009; Cesari, 2004; Listhaug & Strabac, 2008; 
Shaheen, 2003). 
 Media of various kinds acts as a form of cultural transmission, thereby 
influencing mass perceptions of cultural others. This is particularly salient in the case of 
Muslims and Arabs. According to Jack Shaheen’s analysis of over 900 Hollywood films, 
“only 5% of Arab film roles depict normal, human characters” (2003, p. 171), and the 
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other 95% depict them as being primitive and violent religious extremists obsessed with 
money and fair maidens they can ravage. In these films, male Arabs are almost always 
villains, are often bumbling buffoons, are often anti-Christian, and are often referred to 
by protagonists as “dogs” or “monkeys” (Shaheen, 2003). Arab women are instead mute 
on screen, absent from work places, and usually cloaked in black (Shaheen, 2003).  
The presentation and continual repetition of these and similar negative images of 
or metaphors for Muslims creates and internalizes abstract, symbolic racism within the 
masses. Very few alternative narratives have been offered within Western pop culture in 
order to combat these visions of a foreign, savage, and extremist Muslim person. Instead, 
new portrayals often harken back to dusty images of the Crusades and suggestions that 
modernity and Islam are mutually exclusive. The continued view of Muslim groups as 
backwards contributes to a feeling of difference and Western superiority, and as a result, 
the desire for complete assimilation to modern, Western, and Christian ways. 
 The concepts of multiculturalism, assimilation, and nationalism are being heavily 
debated in the public sphere and are interconnected as concepts. Assimilation can be 
defined as the process of becoming like or similar to a majority culture, which is distinct 
from its all-encompassing and all-consuming connotations. Multiculturalism, the 
promotion of minority cultural values and practices within a majority context, has often 
been seen at odds with the process of assimilation. Nationalism, the promotion of one’s 
nation, is often seen as at odds with multiculturalism as well and instead intimately tied to 
racism and ethnocentrism. 
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Assimilation, to various degrees, has become an area of larger focus for political 
debate and research in the West (Brubaker, 2001). Throughout Europe, including the UK, 
there has been a widespread rejection of multicultural society and a feeling of being 
threatened by Islam and refugees, supported by a research study across ten European 
countries (Foster, 2016). According to Hopkins (2011): 
In this regard Europe's Muslims are often placed in a difficult position. They are routinely viewed 
as "in" Europe, but not "of" Europe, and many of Europe's majority populations are wary of 
Muslims enacting their religious identity and prefer them to eschew minority identifications. 
Concerns about minority identity enactment and national loyalty are particularly prominent when 
the minorities are politicized. (p. 253) 
Multiculturalism and assimilation are also viewed differently in the UK and US, which I 
discuss further later on. Muslims are especially suspect to prejudice considering their 
multiple attributed identities and the potential for misconstrual for several groups. As a 
result, this may lead to an increased level of prejudice expressed towards them. Strabac 
and Listhaug, after conducting an analysis of survey data from 30 countries, found that 
“prejudice against Muslims was more widespread than prejudice against other 
immigrants” (2008, p. 268).  
While the increased prejudice towards Muslim groups could be seen as a function 
of race or geography, Muslims exist as a member of every ethnicity and nation and not all 
are immigrants. Unkelbach, Forgas, and Denson (2008) conducted an experiment in the 
UK utilizing a shooting simulator computer game. Results showed a shooter bias for 
targets wearing a turban or a hijab, and supported the idea that increased negative 
tendencies towards Muslims were a result of acquired negative stereotypes. Religious 
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garb, rather than other factors such as race, mediated the violence and prejudice 
expressed towards Muslim people. This suggests that cultural signifiers are particularly 
salient in anti-Muslim prejudice, but race cannot be thrown out as a prominent piece to 
such hostility. 
A study in Canada found that participants held more amicable views towards 
immigrants more similar to themselves, specifically toward British immigrants rather 
than Arab Muslim immigrants (Safdar, Dupuis, Lewis, El-Geledi, & Bourhis, 2008). The 
greatest predictor of acculturation orientations (welcoming individualism or 
integrationism versus unwelcoming assimilationism or segregationism) toward Arab 
Muslims was religiosity of the participant (Safdar et al., 2008). However, religiosity’s 
influence on anti-Muslim prejudice is still being contested. Strabac (2008) found 
religiosity did not mediate prejudice towards Muslims. Whether or not perceived personal 
threat influences anti-Muslim prejudice is still a question to be answered as well 
(Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Hartman et al., 2014; Kinder & Sears, 
1981). 
As a result of these ethnic and religious misconstruals and the subsumption of 
Muslims into groups of various races, the theory of modern racism was utilized as a 
framework for analysis of the data collected for this thesis. In the literature, this is also 
sometimes referred to as “symbolic racism,” “subtle racism,” or “aversive racism.” Often 
used to describe anti-black prejudice, it argues that racism persists in white majority 
populations today, but that it is expressed more covertly as opposition to political policies 
that would aid the black community and as lamentations of the way the black community 
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is imagined to violate traditional American values (Hartman et al., 2014). As shown for 
white-black relations and anti-Hispanic prejudice, individuals understand on some level 
that openly and directly denigrating minority populations, such as Muslims, violates the 
societal norms, values, and narrative of mainstream America (equality, tolerance, the 
melting pot, etc.) (Hartman et al., 2014).  
As in other cases of prejudice, anti-Muslim prejudice manifests through the 
invocation of (perceived or real) minority behaviors that are deemed inappropriate for 
typical American or British values. These behaviors may include refusing to learn 
English, dressing in a way outside the norm, not allowing women to work, praying too 
often or seeming too religious, and much more. It too is expressed in the form of support 
for ‘race neutral,’ or perhaps ‘religion neutral,’ policies that are in opposition to Muslims, 
such as Executive Order 13769 (often colloquially referred to as the ‘travel ban’ or 
‘Muslim ban’).  
While social psychology research tends to define prejudice as developing 
naturally out of the close association between ingroup love and outgroup hate, the 
requirement of outgroup hate for prejudice has since been disproven (Brewer, 1999). One 
can be well-intentioned, ambivalent, or unaware when concerning outgroups, yet still 
express prejudice. This could be a result of positive feelings, empathy, and goodwill 
existing for someone when concerning their ingroup, but not for those outside of it. This, 
while not outright, hostile prejudice to the casual observer, is the makings of subtle, or 
symbolic racism. Many participants found themselves in this position, though to varying 
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degrees. Brewer (1999) explains how loyalty to one’s ingroup can be linked to outgroup 
hatred, though the former is not a prerequisite for the latter. He writes: 
Ingroup love is not a necessary precursor of outgroup hate. However, the very factors that make 
ingroup attachment and allegiance important to individuals also provide a fertile ground for 
antagonism and distrust of those outside the ingroup boundaries. The need to justify ingroup 
values in the form of moral superiority to others, sensitivity to threat, the anticipation of 
interdependence under conditions of distrust, social comparison processes, and power politics all 
conspire to connect ingroup identification and loyalty to disdain and overt hostility toward 
outgroups. (p. 442) 
Muslims are perceived as being obviously different from majority populations based on 
dress. Muslims are often politicized either as a function of 1) the immigration debate, 2) 
terrorism, and 3) moral superiority (when concerning jihad, violence, treatment of 
women, etc.), which has often been invoked by critics of Islam and its followers. Thus, 
they as an outgroup may sit in a particularly vulnerable position for ambivalence to 
transform into hatred. 
However, as I found during my research in 2016 and 2017, recent resistance to 
multiculturalism and the rise of populist political movements are causing large-scale rifts 
in the way modern racism theory plays out (Farage, 2015; The BBC, 2006; Wright, 
2011). There is a violent, extremist minority, particularly spurred on by the anonymity of 
the internet, expressing racism in more direct, blatant forms that would likely be 
considered outdated if performed in-person (i.e. neo-nazi subreddits and 4chan’s 
“politically incorrect” message board) (Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002; Nithyanand, 
Schaffner, & Gill, 2017; Suler, 2004). This trend, unlike modern racism theory, is starkly 
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inconsistent with discourse surrounding modern societal norms and values of the US and 
UK. Still, UKIP (the UK Independence Party that lobbied for ‘Brexit’) and other parties 
and political leaders, are attempting to change political discourse and the values of their 
communities at large. Many now feel that not talking about these issues is a greater moral 
transgression than offending someone with a different skin color, religion, or set of 
beliefs from their own. 
This is supported by previous social psychology research. Merritt, Effron, and 
Monin (2010) argue that “moral self-licensing can alleviate anxiety about saying 
something offensive; thus, self-licensing could be a valuable strategy to facilitate open 
conversations about sensitive topics (e.g., affirmative action)” (p. 355). However, moral 
licensing could also have led to the expression of racism towards minorities through this 
discourse or through political action. Moral licensing occurs when someone does one of 
two things: 1) does something morally wrong but feels it is offset by a previous good 
deed, thus still viewing the action as wrong but being more comfortable in performing it 
or 2) uses a previous good deed to re-contextualize and argue that their ‘bad’ deed was 
not a transgression at all (Merritt et al., 2010). There are several nationally relevant 
political developments in UK and US recent history that may have been used as a 
foundation for moral licensing, such as the election of the first Muslim mayor of London, 
the election of the first black US president, the prevalence of multiculturalist policies, and 
so on (Merritt et al., 2010). These events could be seen as an object for moral licensing 
validating support of anti-immigrant policies, anti-Muslim policies, etc. or as a breaking 
point for those already angry. 
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There is a persistent narrative of class directly influencing political affiliation, 
prejudice, and biases. This often involves economics as a motivator for voting decisions 
and thus with the white, working class being vilified and patronized in works like 
Hillbilly Elegy. However, class is not the sole motivator of political decisions. This 
narrative is not completely true when faced with further examination. As Achterberg 
described in 2006, cultural issues and “identity politics” have increasingly become 
important influences upon voting behavior for those on all sides of the political spectrum 
in several Western countries, including both the US and Britain. Further, he argued that 
these cultural interests could explain ‘unnatural’ voting behavior, for example the US 
middle class supporting a Republican candidate that will not benefit them in terms of 
class mobility. The recent ‘freeing’ of discourse surrounding cultural issues, its 
increasing importance to voting behavior, and the use of culture rather than biology for 
racist justification likely contribute to expressions of symbolic racism, whether they be 




 There are at least 2.6 million Muslims in the US, two-thirds of whom are US-born 
citizens (Schaefer, 2010). Black Muslims comprise only 5% of African Americans but 
are estimated to comprise 90% of all converts to Islam in the US (Schaefer, 2010). This 
likely stems from the 10% of African slaves who were Muslim before being forced into 
Christianity by white colonialists (Schaefer, 2010). 
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American contact with Islam resulted from a number of different events. Spanish 
Muslims came with conquistadors to the Americas (Schaefer, 2010). World’s fairs 
brought Arab presenters to American cities in the 19th century, a positive experience for 
viewers although filtered through orientalism (Griffiths, 2002; Rony, 1996; Schaefer, 
2010). This and US-funded missionary programs in the Middle East, encouraged Arab 
immigration to the US, but after 9/11, there was a decline of approximately 30% in Arab 
and Muslim immigration to the US (Schaefer, 2010). Numbers rebounded in later years, 
but since the institution of the ‘travel ban’ there is a great deal of uncertainty for the 
future of immigration from Muslim predominant countries (Schaefer, 2010).  
Out of 9/11 came a shift in political and social organization called the “war on 
terrorism.” This entailed war in the Middle East, imprisonment of accused people in 
Guantanamo Bay, and also a cultural change with pervasive effects. An “atmosphere of 
extreme suspicion” persists in America, arguably resulting in greater discrimination 
against Muslims (Cesari, 2004).  
Obsessing over Muslim women and their treatment, US media often attempts to 
“understand” 9/11 using perceived negative cultural differences rather than providing 
historical and political basis for the attacks (Abu-Lughod, 2002). This contributes to the 
East versus West dichotomy. Much like in the UK, this is rooted in an extensive history 
of colonialism, which is bolstered by the idea of the white savior (US citizens) helping 
the oppressed woman (Muslim women in the Middle East). This narrative also 
contributes to the gendered view that Muslim women lack agency (Abu-Lughod, 2002).  
16 
 
More recently, political events have displayed a prejudice against the perceived 
ethnic, religious, and geographical composition of Muslims. The rhetoric of the 2016 
presidential campaign of Donald Trump, and others, was vehemently anti-immigrant. 
Following Trump’s election, there was an increase in the prevalence of hate crimes 
(Williams, 2018). Although this is common during election years, there has been a 
palpable change in rhetoric, policy, and prejudice expression when it concerns minority 
groups, especially those existing at the intersection of minority labels such as Muslims 
(Williams, 2018). The rise in hate crimes specifically against Muslims during 2016 also 
surpassed that of 2001 (the year of 9/11) (Kishi, 2017).  
One policy that exemplifies prejudice on a broader, public scale is the “Muslim 
ban,” which was specifically aimed to obstruct the immigration of those from countries 
with Muslim majority affiliation. In 2018, this culminated in the Supreme Court case 
Trump v. Hawaii, wherein the court upheld the ban. The rationale behind the decision, 
provided by judges both for and against the ban, focused on the preservation of families 
(Fetters, 2018). Familial loyalty and love is a traditional value often espoused as being 
one uniquely Christian and American. It can also act as a poignant appeal to the 
similarities that majority populations may share with marginalized groups. In support of 
the ban, Chief Justice Roberts argued that provisions had been made for the reuniting of 
families as an exemption. This argument suggests that ‘normal’ Muslims with traditional 
values are the exception rather than the rule; it is then assumed the majority is composed 
of threats to the US. In the end, the fear surrounding a group of people perceived as being 
an unfamiliar, threatening international political force overpowered the potential 
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familiarity one could find in the desire to be with one’s family (See historic Supreme 
Court cases Ozawa v. United States and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind). This 
exemplifies well the ambivalence the West holds concerning Islam that Said (1977) 
describes as going back to their first encounters. As he explained, the threat of Islam can 
either be handled via Christian understandings or be feared for its alienness.  
Negative attitudes towards Islam in the aftermath of terrorist events can be seen 
on a local scale as well. In Murfreesboro, TN, a city of approximately 130,000 people 
near my US-based research field site, there has been great controversy over the 
construction of a larger Islamic Center aimed at accommodating the 1,000 members of a 
smaller facility. This smaller facility has existed since the early 1980’s, and yet it was in 
2010 that local unrest began (Smietana, 2014). 
In 2010, the Rutherford County judge approved construction of a new Islamic 
Center. Following this, hundreds marched in protest and the televangelist Pat Robertson 
called it a “mega mosque,” claiming Muslims were taking over Murfreesboro (Smietana, 
2014). In the same year, an arsonist set fire to one of the new center’s construction 
vehicles. In 2011, a bomb threat was made against the center (Kemph, 2012). For several 
years those fighting the center attempted to block its construction by suing the county, 
many arguing that Islam is not a religion. A local judge initially ruled in favor of those 
opposing the mosque, but a federal court overturned the decision. The mosque was 
opened despite resistance in 2012. The case against the center was brought to the 
Supreme Court, but they declined to hear it in June 2014, ending the long struggle. In 
total, this cost Rutherford County over $340,000 in legal fees (Smietana, 2014). This was 
18 
 
not the end, however, of opposition to the mosque. In 2016, several thousand dollars in 
cash donations were stolen from the center in a burglary at the end of Ramadan, and in 
2017, a group of vandals defaced the building with graffiti and bacon. The two men 




Fig. 1.1 Example of vandalism of Islamic Center in Murfreesboro, TN 
Source: Clarksville Now 
  
In contrast, the site of my study, Bowling Green, KY, has multiple mosques. 
Participants often said they were aware that the mosques existed but did not notice them 
or think about them. When construction of a new mosque was being proposed in 2004, a 
Muslim doctor managing the plans was interviewed. He explained to the local newspaper, 
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“In a sense the religion [of Islam] is an extension of both the Jewish and Christian 
religions, adding to them the revelations of the Prophet Mohammad. We are part of this 
community. Our children are Americans. We love our country” (Miller, 2004). The 
Muslim community appeared to bear the burden of addressing and dissipating any fears 
held by the majority population. They had to distance themselves from images of 
terrorists as much as possible. 
The original Islamic Center was a place where people of all cultures, ethnicities, 
and geographical origins could meet to worship. The group who wished to build a new 
mosque was comprised entirely of Bosnians2. During the interim period before the 
completion of the building, they worshipped in a maintenance garage separate from other 
Muslims, collecting dues from committee members in order to fund their ultimate goal 
(Mink, 2012). Now, the Bosnian mosque sits next to a Church of Christ. It was dedicated 
in 2012 during the 17th convention of Bosniaks in North America. Over 10,000 Bosnians 
from around the world converged in Bowling Green, KY with this event at its center 
(Mink, 2012).   
The differing reception of the construction of these two mosques could be rooted 
in a number of fears and prejudices. The Muslim community in Bowling Green appeared 
to succeed primarily because of their ethnic composition—Bosnians who present as being 
white. They may have succeeded also partly because the Muslim community leaders 
attempted to conform their group to Christian images of Islam, speaking of it as an 
extension of familiar religions. This is the familiar strategy of the West in coping with 
                                                          
2 Bowling Green, Kentucky is a refugee resettlement location with a high number of Bosnian refugees 
having been relocated there in recent years. 
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fears of the Muslim other. Said (1977) describes this in his influential text, Orientalism, 
saying: 
Islam is judged to be a fraudulent new version of some previous experience, in this case 
Christianity. The threat is muted, familiar values impose themselves, and in the end the mind 
reduces the pressure upon it by accommodating things to itself as either "original" or "repetitious." 
Islam thereafter is "handled": its novelty and its suggestiveness are brought under control so that 
relatively nuanced discriminations are now made that would have been impossible had the raw 
novelty of Islam been left unattended. The Orient at large, therefore, vacillates between the West's 
contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in— or fear of— novelty. (p. 59) 
It is also important to consider the compositional differences between these two 
towns. Bowling Green, while smaller and consisting of 65,000 people, is also a 
“preferred community” for refugee resettlement and a college town. Murfreesboro is 
about twice as large in terms of population and is known for its ties to regional civil war 
and plantation history. 
The Bowling Green mosque and its attendees are perceived to be more similar to 
the majority population in terms of both religious belief and ethnic composition. They 
appear to be less of a cultural threat and have effectively distanced themselves from 
terrorism and appearing as a political threat. Instead, the Murfreesboro community 
appears to perceive a cultural distance between them and Muslims, leading to the direct 
demonstration of it by vandals when they decorated the local mosque with bacon. 
 
 UK Background 
 Post-colonialist ties are some of the most well-established factors influencing 
modern day perceptions of Muslims in Britain. British ties to countries with majority 
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Muslim populations began with colonization and the arms of the empire. According to 
Phillips, “The now-familiar debate about identity and citizenship was sparked off when 
the first Caribbeans stepped off the Windrush” (2011, para. 10). The Windrush was a 
wave of immigration after WWII from the new Commonwealth countries of India, 
various Caribbean islands, Pakistan, and others. Further examples can be found in the 
partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, which continued to leave its “mark on 
subcontinental politics fifty years after the event” (Gilmartin, 1998, p. 1068). Each were 
once a piece of pre-partition “British” India. Immigration patterns throughout British 
history can be traced back to this. Footholds like Leicester, an area near this project’s 
studied region that was often referenced as a diverse Muslim hub, were established as a 
result of this major change (Ballard, 2002).  
Muslims, and other post-colonial minority populations exist somewhere on the 
dividing line between West and non-West (Pedziwiatr, 2009). One historian theorized 
that the British Empire helped to solidify Muslim identity as a result of British 
understandings of India and religious revivalism (Robinson, 1998). The majority of 
Muslims in the UK are South Asian and they can be placed into three major categories: 
the Gujaratis, the Punjabis, and the Bangladeshis (Dwyer, 2008). Distinguishing between 
post-colonial prejudice against these South Asian communities and expressions of 
Islamophobia in Britain can be difficult due to the populations’ overlap (Thomas & 
Sanderson, 2011). One survey found that 90% of South Asians use religion as a self-
identifier and that it holds primacy over skin color, which was as significant as height to 
their sense of self (Husain & O’Brien, 2000).  
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Often prejudice against Muslims is intimately intertwined with that against 
immigrant groups and various other minorities. This is partly due to population overlap 
and to media portrayals such as those analyzed by Shaheen (2003). It has been shown that 
as early as the 1970s there was a fear of foreigners and their cultures saturating Britain 
and undoing the status quo (Barker, 1981; Gonzalez et al., 2008). This argument is not 
unlike that of the UKIP party in recent years.  
Richardson (2004) cites four main themes of negative stereotypes of Muslims and 
Islam that appear in British broadsheet press: (1) Muslim countries pose a military threat; 
(2) Islam poses a threat of political violence and extremism; (3) Muslim political 
leaders/parties in the UK pose a threat to democracy; and (4) There is great gender 
inequality within the Muslim community, which poses a social threat. These slot well 
into the two categories of negative stereotypes of Islam from Strabac and Listhaug 
(2008): political and military threats; and cultural contradictions to the Western value 
system.  
One aspect of modern fear of cultural saturation and the popularity of British 
populism is the concept of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism in this context could be 
defined as the promotion, or allowance, of a variety of cultures and lifeways to coexist 
within Britain without the pressure of assimilation. A study in the Netherlands found that 
those who endorse multiculturalism perceive less symbolic threat from and have fewer 
negative stereotypes of Muslims (Gonzalez et al., 2008). Multiculturalism may reduce 
group threat and promote social equality. However, multiculturalism has been challenged 
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by British political leaders and recent events (Farage, 2015; The BBC, 2006; Wright, 
2011). 
Brexit has changed the political and social landscape of Britain. In the weeks 
following the referendum, there was a sharp increase in hate crimes (Westcott, 2016). 
The Muslim Council of Britain collected images of these from social media, creating a 
gallery of “100 hate incidents,” shown in Figure 1.2, in an argument for the Home 
Secretary to help in better protecting migrants (Westcott, 2016). Some argue that there is 
more freedom to talk about issues such as immigration.  
 
 
Fig. 1.2 Examples of hate incidents catalogued by the MCB following the referendum  




To complicate matters further, one must also consider the question of Ummah3, 
and whether it is perceived as being an essential part of Muslim identity to other groups. 
With globalization and technological advances, it is easier for Muslims to identify with 
others across borders. Many organizations define Muslim identity as transnational. There 
are two British organizations with different orientations, intentions, and beliefs, who do 
so. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, est. 1997) lobbies for Muslim representation as 
a traditional interest group does, while the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT, est. 1953) focuses more 
on the global identity of Islam and finds its interests to be at odds with that of ‘Western’ 
ideas and liberalism (Adamson, 2011). Complicating matters further, between March 
2009 and January 2010, the British government suspended its relationship with the HT 
after its release of a controversial stance on Israel (Adamson, 2011). Which type of 
organization the general public perceives as representative of Islam and its followers is 
central to their perception of and interactions with Muslims. 
 The bombings of July 7, 2005 first catapulted Islam to the forefront of British 
society’s consciousness. Researchers today see this as the event that “confirmed the 
picture of Muslim youth as oppositional to British values, prompting the blaming of 
multiculturalism and attempts to ‘prevent violent extremism” (Thomas & Sanderson, 
2011, p. 1028). 
 The BBC interviewed experts and regular citizens in the aftermath of the 
calamitous event. Dr. Waheed, a representative from the Hizb ut-Tahrir, explained that 
                                                          
3 Ummah is a term referring to the concept of a broader transnational community of Muslims. This has 
been used as a way to increase identity cohesion in a positive way within the community and as a form of 
recruitment for extremists. It is something questioned by the West as it is perceived as exemplifying the 
broader political force of Islam. 
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the whole of society should accept responsibility for the attacks, rather than placing it all 
on the shoulders of the Muslim community. He went further to say that “the media needs 
to stop demonizing Muslims and fanning the flames of Islamophobia” (The BBC, 2005).  
The average citizen responded quite differently. R.S. of Bath said, “Surely the 
problem is not that Muslims are not given opportunity to integrate - it is that the Muslim 
leaders have not been clear enough in rejecting many of the non-inclusive aspects of 
Islam” (The BBC, 2005). Paul, a citizen from Cambridgeshire, worried about the loyalty 
of Muslims to the UK, saying that “it does seem British born Muslims are first and 
foremost Muslim. Any other attachments, such as nationality, come a very poor second, 
at best” (The BBC, 2005). These comments reflect the concerns expressed by UK citizens 
eleven years later in my own research: terrorism, extremism, integration, self-segregation, 
identity, and loyalty, among others. These broader issues were exemplified in local 
reactions to Islam and its expansion at the UK site of my research. While nearby cities 
had mosques, Grantham was bereft of a place of worship for Muslims, and in the past 
there had been conflict surrounding the construction of a mosque. In 2014 a petition was 
created on Change.org against the construction of an Islamic Centre in Grantham by a 
user called, “People of Grantham No Longer Silent” with the Queen of England as their 
avatar. It intended to force decision-makers of the South Kesten District Council to reject 
the proposed plans for the Islamic Centre. In a town of approximately 44,000, this 
garnered 626 supporters in total.  
 Then, in February 2014, a protest was staged against the building of the mosque 
by the Grantham Town English Defense League (“Proposed Islamic centre,” 2014). The 
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English Defense League is a far-right movement that opposes the spread of Islam and 
Sharia Law in the UK. A counter-protest was led by a local activist as well, so overall 
there were around 250 police officers and 250 protesters involved (Corker, 2014). In the 
end, those against the construction of the mosque succeeded. The Lincolnshire County 
Council directed the building application to be named invalid based on bureaucratic 
issues.  
 However, a group called the Grantham Muslim Community Association (GMCA) 
has existed since 1984, according to their website, and began to construct a Grantham 
Islamic Centre in 2016. They offer the current space up for prayer in the meantime and 
have staged events with the local non-Muslim community. In July 2016, the month 
following the referendum, the GMCA hosted a celebration of Eid-ul-Fitr at a nearby 
village. The mayor and other non-Muslim political leaders attended (Newton, 2016). This 





Fig. 1.3 The GMCA’s celebration of Eid-ul-Fitr in a nearby village 
Source: The Grantham Journal 
 
 
 In the city of the nearest mosque, Lincoln, a new mosque was proposed in 2014 as 
well due to the rapidly growing Muslim population in the area. This is currently in the 
process of being built. There are multiple reasons for its success and Grantham’s 
backlash. First, Lincoln is a much larger and more diverse city. Second, it has had a 
mosque already since 1981, though it can only accommodate 60 people at maximum 
capacity. Third, and finally, the Lincoln mosque was written about by the BBC and 
marketed as a way to prevent radicalization and religious extremism via utilization of 
transnational Muslim internet sources. The Grantham mosque was instead viewed as a 
transgression against the traditional British way of life.  
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This set of events helps to mirror the overall picture of UK concerns and the 
model utilized in this thesis for negative stereotypes of Islam. The Lincoln mosque 
succeeded because it prevented further political and military threats and the Grantham 
mosque initially failed because of its cultural contradictions to the British value system. 
With this historical, scholarly, and regional context, I will now explain what methods I 









 To collect data regarding my research questions, a variety of methods were 
combined, thereby triangulating and strengthening resulting findings. These were 
intended to provide a multi-faceted view of the interaction between white-identifying 
populations and Muslim groups by producing an array of qualitative and quantitative data 
and decipherable patterns. Due to the fact that this research project involved human 
subjects, I obtained certification for social and behavioral research with human subjects 
through the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative Program (CITI) (11/19/2015) 
and fulfilled Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (04/22/2016).  
Participants were initially recruited through the use of flyers and followed up by 
phone and email (Appendix A). Flyers were generally less effective for recruitment than 
word of mouth and personal communication. Key informants were identified as I built 
rapport in both the US and the UK. Thus, snowball sampling, wherein participants recruit 
further participants and so on, was relied upon. Participants were assigned alphabetically-
based pseudonyms and thus their responses were confidential. Twenty-five participants 
were recruited overall, fifteen from the US and ten from the UK. Participants completed a 
demographic survey wherein gender, ethnicity, religion, and level of religiousness were 
self-reported. Then participants completed card sorting and free listing tasks. 
30 
 
Approximately half of participants proceeded to take part in a semi-structured 
interview. Each participant was offered a $10 or £10 gift card incentive for participation. 
One US interview was excluded due to the poor quality of audio.  
Methods were chosen and carefully considered due to the sensitive nature of this 
topic. Interviews were fairly successful partly because of my identity as a white 
European-seeming young woman. Due to the subjective and reflexive nature of 
ethnography, this resulted in a disinhibition where white populations expressed views 
they may not have with an outgroup member. While interviews were vital to gaining a 
nuanced view of participants’ views and allowing them to express it in their own words, 
they are also a very direct and explicit way to approach this topic. It follows that some 
participants may have expressed views which they do not actually believe, a more 
palatable version of their beliefs, or perhaps an explicit attitude that differs from their 
implicit biases. The card sorting and free listing tasks were vital to getting at these 
potential issues in a less explicit format. 
Field Site Descriptions 
The US site used in this research project was a suburban college town one hour 
from a large metropolitan area. Its residents were predominantly Republican, Christian, 
and white, though there was a large Eastern European immigrant population (United 
States Census Bureau, 2017; “2016 Kentucky presidential election results,” 2016). 




The average age of the 15 participants in the US was 42, with the youngest being 
18 and the oldest being 73. All US participants were white and their average reported 
level of religiousness was 3.4. Four of them were male and eleven were female. 53.33% 




Fig. 2.1 The shaded region corresponds to the county studied 
 
The UK site used in this research project (pictures in Appendix B) was semi-rural 
with a college in the area. The residents were primarily Conservative, Christian, and 
white, but there was a large Eastern European immigrant population. It was an hour train 
ride from a large metropolitan area and close to several cities with large Muslim 
populations and a number of mosques. Data was collected in the UK from August to 
December 2016.  
Of the 10 UK participants, all were over the age of 40, with the oldest being 71. 
Their average age was 58. 50% of UK participants were male and 50% were female. All 
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participants identified as white and they reported an average religiousness of 4.4. 80% 





Fig. 2.2 The shaded region corresponds to the shire studied 
 
Participant Observation 
 As is typical of Anthropology, I conducted participant observation while at my 
field sites and surrounding areas (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). I took 
photographs of the region and material items and I took notes on notable events I 
encountered, such as the failed school trip to Leicester or the protest in Nottingham. In 
addition to the recordings I engaged in daily interactions and informal conversations with 
people living at my field sites. This data provided necessary contextualization for the 




Drawing on Bernard (1988) and Burton & Romney’s (1975) research 
methodologies, I developed a card sorting task for the US and UK participants. The card 
sorting task consisted of participants sorting through a set of 22 cards and arranging them 
according to predetermined categories (see Appendix C). The cards depicted different 
people, including variables for race, gender and faith affiliation as indicated vis-à-vis 
apparel. Each participant sorted the 22 cards six times. Cards were coded with letters 
representing characteristics of those depicted on them. The order of each card sorting was 
recorded, utilizing the codes. This task allowed for the analysis of distinctions white-
identifying populations in the US and UK make between those they perceive as being 
Muslim and non-Muslim. It also allowed for the identification of what values they 
associate with the general populace versus Muslim groups. Below is the categorization in 
which participants sorted the cards: 
1. Piousness (most to least) 
2. Trustworthiness (most to least) 
3. Sociability (most to least) 
4. Similarity to self (most to least) 
5. How British/American they seem (most to least) 







 Utilizing Brewer’s (2002) methodology, I constructed a free listing task. The free 
listing tasks consisted of participants delineating any lexical items they could recall that 
fit within predetermined categories. This provided a methodological instrument to assess 
linguistic associations my research participants had about Muslims, and citizens of the 
UK or US. Below is a list of the prompts used in this study:   
1. Write down any qualities that signal someone is British/American to you. 
2. Write down any qualities that signal someone is Muslim to you. 
3. Name all the famous or influential Muslim people you can think of. 
4. Name all the famous or influential Christian people you can think of. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviewing 
 Drawing on Bernard (1988), my classroom fieldwork experiences, and a review 
of the literature as a reference point, I developed a semi-structured interview protocol. 
The semi-structured interviewing consisted of a set of seventeen interview questions (see 
Appendix D). As per the instrument design, semi-structured interviews incorporate a 
level of fluidity, relying on the conversation to further shape the interview. This results in 
the ability to delve more deeply into a particular topic of importance and allows the 
interviewer to ask detailed follow-up questions (as opposed to formal interview design) 
(Agar, 1996; Schensul et al., 1999). An H4n zoom recorder was used during interviews. 
Interviews lasted approximately one hour each. Eleven interviews were fully transcribed 
and a content analysis was performed. This provided qualitative data that allowed for 
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identification of more complex and subtle patterns in language and ideas concerning 
Muslim groups and identity more generally. Appendix E delineates each of the six 
themes drawn out of the interviewing data and provides examples of words and phrases 









T-tests were used for statistical analysis of card sorting data, both linear and 
nonlinear. All of the cards were sorted similarly across the two countries for the different 
categories, except for one card for trustworthiness, two cards for sociability, two cards for 
similarity to self, and six cards for how British/American they seemed. See Appendix F 
for the list of individual card differences between countries. These differences are further 
dissected in the comparison section of the chapter 4. Generally, results showed that those 
cards displaying characteristics typically associated with Muslims (i.e. dark skin and 
traditional clothing) were sorted as being less similar to participants, trustworthy and 
sociable, and more pious. Nine out of the 25 participants produced at least one nonlinear 
response. Based on analysis of nonlinear responses, piousness was the most difficult to 
sort and nationality was the least difficult to sort.  
Though my first five card sorting tasks asked participants to sort the cards 
continuously from most to least, participants struggled with making direct comparisons 
between cards. Some preferred to compare them indirectly so much that they created 
groups of their own. Participants seemed to struggle the most with the first and second 
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card sorts— most to least pious and most to least trustworthy. This manifested in 
participants creating their own groups more often and there being fewer groups per 
participant for the categories. For example, participants may have chosen to create most 
and least groups (or 2 groups), others chose to create a most, middle, and least group (or 
3 groups). Some participants said they were all the same and put every card into a single 
group. These were all labeled as non-linear, or non-continuous responses and were seen 
as categorically different from linear responses. Some non-continuous responses were 
more complex, with some cards being put in a continuous line and then a few designated 
as most or least but without internal order. I interpreted these more complex responses as 
indicative of increased ability to make direct comparisons. The number of categories 
employed in responses to Card Sorting Task One was significantly smaller than the 
number of categories employed for Card Sorting Task Three, t(24) = -1.79, p = 0.043 , d 
= -0.36, and Card Sorting Task Five, t(24) = -1.865, p = 0.037, d = -0.37. The difference 
in the number of categories employed for Card Sorting Task One versus Card Sorting 
Task Four also approached significance, t(24) = -1.60, p = 0.061, d = -0.32. 
For piousness, there was a significant difference indicating people categorized 
those with medium or dark skin as more pious than those with light or olive skin, t(23) = 
-4.259, p < .001, d = -0.87; those wearing traditional dress as more pious than those 
wearing western dress, t(23) = -8.527, p < .001, d = -1.74; women as more pious than 
men, t(23) = -2.683, p = 0.013, d = -0.55; women wearing plain traditional dress as more 





For trustworthiness, there was a significant difference indicating people 
categorized women as more trustworthy than men, t(23) = -4.460, p < .001, d = -0.91; 
those with light or olive skin as more trustworthy than those with medium or dark skin, 
t(23) = -2.448, p = 0.022, d = -0.50; women with fashionable traditional clothing as more 
trustworthy than women with plain traditional clothing, t(23) = 6.527, p < .001, d = 1.33; 
those with more obvious and more concealing traditional clothing as less trustworthy than 
those with western clothes, t(23) = 3.777, p < .001, d = 0.77, and than those with less 
obvious and less concealing traditional clothing, t(23) = -6.525, p < .001, d = -1.33. There 
however, was not a significant difference between all stimuli with traditional clothing 
versus stimuli with western clothing, or the less obvious and less concealing traditional 
clothing versus western clothing. 
For sociability, there was a significant difference indicating people categorized 
women as more sociable than men, t(24) = -3.545, p = 0.002, d = -0.71; those with light 
or olive skin as more sociable than those with medium or dark skin, t(24) = -4.071, p < 
.001, d = -0.81; those with western dress as more sociable than those with traditional 
dress, t(24) = -4.662, p < .001, d = -0.93; those with less obvious and less concealing 
traditional dress as more sociable than those with more obvious and more concealing 
traditional dress, t(24) = 7.017, p < .001, d = 1.40; women with fashionable traditional 
dress as more sociable than women with plain traditional dress, t(24) = 7.255, p < .001,  
d = 1.45. 
For similarity to self, there was a significant difference indicating people 
categorized those with Western clothing as more similar to self than those with traditional 
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clothing, t(24) = -6.180, p < .001, d = -1.24; those with less obvious and less concealing 
traditional clothing as more similar to self than those with more obvious and more 
concealing traditional clothing, t(24) = 5.962, p < .001, d = 1.19; women with fashionable 
traditional clothing as more similar to self than women with plain traditional clothing, 
t(24) = -5.982, p < .001, d = -1.20; those with light or olive skin as more similar to self 
than those with medium or dark skin, t(24) = -5.873, p < .001, d = -1.18.  
For how British or American they seemed, there was a significant difference 
indicating people categorized those with western clothing as more British or American 
than those with traditional clothing, t(23) = -11.147, p < .001, d = -2.28; those with less 
obvious and less concealing traditional clothing as more British or American than those 
with more obvious and more concealing traditional clothing, t(23) = 8.978, p < .001, d = 
1.83; women with fashionable traditional clothing as more British or American than 
women with plain traditional clothing, t(23) = -3.803, p < .001, d = -0.78; those with light 
or olive skin as more British or American than those with medium or dark skin, t(23) = -









T-tests were also used to statistically analyze free listing data. Data showed some 
differences between the US and UK. However, overall the US and UK appeared to 
perceive Muslims more negatively than Christians.  
Across countries, there were no significant differences between the total number 
of answers or the number of negative responses except for Free Listing Task One, where 
UK participants provided significantly more responses than US participants, t(9) = 2.509, 
p = 0.033, d = 0.79. While there was a significant difference between number of 
responses for Free Listing Task One (qualities of British/American people) versus Free 
Listing Task Two (qualities of Muslim people) for the UK data, with more responses to 
Free Listing Task One than Two, t(9) = 2.756, p = 0.022, d = 0.87, there was not for the 
US data. And while there was not a significant difference for number of responses for 
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Free Listing Task Three (famous/influential Muslims) versus Free Listing Task Four 
(famous/influential Christians) for the UK data, there was a significant difference for the 
US data, with more responses for Free Listing Task Four, t(14) = -3.613, p = 0.003,  
d = -0.93. Both the UK and US participants wrote significantly more negative responses 
for Free Listing Task Three (influential Muslims) than for Free Listing Task Four 
(influential Christians), t(9) = 2.449, p = 0.037, d = 0.78, t(13) = 2.797, p = 0.015,  




Fig. 3.2 Free Listing Task Analysis  
 
Semi-Structured Interviewing 
Six key themes were drawn out of content analysis of each of the fully transcribed 
semi-structured interviews. These, in order of their frequency of expression, were: (1) 
perceived rigidity of Muslim culture, (2) unfamiliarity with Muslim culture, (3) societal 
pressure causing fear to interact with and talk about the Muslim community, (4) 
perceived isolation of Muslim groups, (5) perceived negative ties associated with 
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traditional Muslim clothing, and (6) difficulty identifying individuals in specific 
groupings. These themes were further broken down into more complex subthemes. The 
complete taxonomy of these themes can be found in Figure 3.3. There were 522 instances 
of these themes catalogued in participant interviews. Figure 3.4 displays the frequency of 
expression of each of these themes in a bar graph. A table of interview quotes 
exemplifying each of these themes can be found in Appendix G. As can be seen in 
Appendix G, several of these themes overlapped. For example, concern about Islam’s 
strict qualities often involved or led into a discussion of Muslim women’s safety and 












Fig. 3.4 Graph of number of Instances of Interview themes 
Having presented the results here, the next chapter will elaborate further on more 
descriptive analyses, the implications of these findings and the context surrounding them. 
The data from card sorting, free listing, interviews, and participant observation will be 
examined in combination for each of the various themes presented above. Further cross-
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In this section, I will go through each of the six broad themes drawn out of the 
interview data in order of their frequency of expression. Each will be contextualized and 
triangulated with results from the card sorting and free listing tasks. This will be based 
upon the combined data of UK and US participants. Areas of divergence between the two 
countries’ data sets will be addressed separately. 
The data conformed well to Strabac and Listhaug’s (2008) two categories of 
negative stereotypes, the clash of civilizations and cultural concern. However, However, 
the frequency of data was higher in the cultural concern category. This could be a result 
of the level of expression that was studied (individual rather than societal), the intimacy 
of the study (done one-on-one in cafes and libraries), the nature of the types of questions 
asked, or unspoken societal standards for this sort of discourse. Concerns about the 
political implications of Islam were often stronger statements that perhaps surpassed the 
limits usually set by certain sections of society.  
Participants often conflated Muslims with immigrants as an identity category, and 
therefore spoke of economic threat. However, an overwhelming majority focused on their 
perceptions of the Muslim community as violating societal standards and expectations
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due to culture. This was defined in a number of ways: unapproachability, strangeness, 
lack of integration, not following American laws but their own religion’s, resistance to 
learning English, and negative aspects of the burqa and the hijab. The data then supports 
both a perception and practice-based reasoning for negative view of Muslims. This kind 
of disapproval appeared to be much more immediate and pressing than that stemming 
from an economic threat. Some participants criticized a simplistic financial view being 
employed by media sources and academics to understand conservative attitudes. All of 
the above cultural lamentations could be labeled as coded expressions of prejudice. This 
represents how anti-Muslim prejudice is generally expressed on an individual level— in 
the form of symbolic racism.  
There were some instances of concern about the political and military threat of 
Islam conveyed in interviews as well, but these were less often indicated when discussing 
Western Muslim populations. This was communicated by referring to Islam or its 
practices as ‘scary,’ describing the religion or its practitioners as strict or sometimes 
extremist, conflating Muslims in the West with those in the Middle East, and expressing 
concern for one’s safety as a result of women’s traditional dress. 
 
1. Rigidity 
Followers of the Muslim faith were characterized by participants as being more 
devout and more restricted. Often conversations about restriction shifted to the perceived 
gender inequality in Muslim culture. There were 168 total instances of the theme of 
rigidity in interviews. This was further broken down into two sub-themes: (1) Muslims 
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being restricted, which includes the perceived oppression of Muslim women, general 
restriction by the nature of their faith, and the wearing of uniforms that eschew 
individuality; and (2) Muslims being strict, which entails the enactment of more 
structured rules and rites of behavior.  
A large part of this perceived rigidity comes from a stereotype of Muslims as 
being more heavily religious. Many echoed the sentiments of US participant G, who 
described Islam as a much more “religious religion.” This is an example of reduplication, 
which itself implies a magnification of the level of religious devotion that Muslims enact 
to a higher level than other adjectival forms could achieve. From this it can be inferred 
that Islam and its followers particularly stands apart from other religions in terms of 
piety. In the card sorting task, those images that displayed features that were more 
commonly associated with Muslim populations were sorted as being more pious. Those 
with medium or dark skin and those wearing traditional Muslim dress were sorted as 
more pious than those with light skin and western dress. Those viewed as being the most 
pious, however, were women, especially those wearing unembellished, more concealing 
traditional clothing. This was reflected in interviews as well. Women were often used to 
demonstrate the restriction and strict qualities of Islam yet pitied for their perceived 
forcible situation.  
Participants’ focus on perceived negative cultural aspects of the Muslim 
community in interviews often included a disapproval of their lack of agency and 
individual thought. As Stromberg (2012) points out, Western societies are heavily 
individualistic; free will and individual autonomy are foundational cultural assumptions 
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intimately linked with God and capitalism. The author suggests then that lapses in this 
sense of agency are particularly culturally salient and therefore often result in confusion 
and political conflict (Stromberg, 2012). Muslims were often described as conforming to 
their religion blindly, wearing a homogenizing uniform, and having no choice in their 
actions, especially so for women. Even if someone is well-informed about cultural 
practices within the Muslim community, if they perceive that Muslim culture or religion 
is taking away the members’ sense of agency, it could evoke a visceral, negative 
response.  
This was especially salient when participants were also concerned about the well-
being of women within the Muslim community. Muslim women were spoken of as if 
they simply had no choice in matters of their own lives, whether they exist in the East or 
West. Muslim men were then the oppressors— the villains taking away agency from 
fragile foreign women in need of Western freedom. For example, UK participant E said, 
“About modesty… I think they expect it of the women. So, I think it’s almost like an 
obligation they put on the women, but it comes from their scriptures and their beliefs.” 
This gender differential in perception of Muslims’ sense of agency, conformity, 
strictness, and restriction fit the archetype built by Hollywood movies analyzed by 
Shaheen (2003). Women lacked agency and were restricted while men enforced their will 
on others and were strict.  
Often in interviews and the free listing task, participants conflated Islam with the 
political force of the Middle East and extremists. Participants spoke of extremist imams 
42 
 
preaching hatred of the West in the UK, and 9/11 and other events of terrorism in the US. 
US participant D recalled anti-Muslim prejudice he had seen before in the area, saying,  
D: Most of what I’ve noticed locally are bumper stickers that are infuriating about— oh  
there was one guy who drove around a pickup truck that he had put decals on of the 
towers in New York being hit on 9/11 and a bumper sticker on the back that said, “I 
learned all I need to know about Islam on 9/11.” You go, “Alright. Oh. At least we know 
where you stand. (laughs)  
Participants overwhelmingly listed Muslim extremists and terrorists in Free Listing Task 
Three, which involved naming any famous or influential Muslim people they could 
recall. Examples of violent figures listed included Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, 
ISIS, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Nidal Hasan (listed as “the Fort Hood shooter”), 
Muammar Gaddafi, Idi Amin, Genghis Khan, and Assad (current president of Syria). 
Material culture during participant observation reflected a conflation of Islam in 
the West with a political Islamic force and a focus on extremism and violence as well. 
Some bookstores I came across held specialized sections about Islam, the Middle East, or 
various Muslim cultures. These can be seen in Appendix H. Many of the books within 
these special displays were about Jihad, ISIS, women’s subordination, or other violent or 
oppressive aspects of Islam. Still, there were some books by authors from predominantly 
Muslim countries written in English or Arabic with more positive outlooks. One book 
proudly displayed the variety of Muslim fashion, a direct contradiction to the typical 
Western view that traditional coverings are uniforms preventing expression of 
individuality. 
 
2. Unfamiliarity  
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 Participants expressed a general lack of knowledge of Islam and the Muslim 
community. Often, they referred to Muslim populations in terms of their strangeness or 
foreign qualities. This theme greatly stemmed from ethnocentrism. This was broken 
down further into two sub-themes: (1) alienness of the Muslim community, which 
includes references to the community as different, conflation with immigrants and foreign 
peoples, and descriptions of aspects of the community as scary, and (2) ignorance of 
Muslim culture. There were 157 instances of words or phrases indicating unfamiliarity 
with the Muslim community.  
 Lack of knowledge of or unfamiliarity with the Muslim community was the most 
pervasive sub-theme expressed in interviews overall. Variations of the phrase “I don’t 
know,” with 77 instances, were the most common indicated by participants in interviews. 
“I don’t know” can act as a discourse marker and in these instances there is the potential 
for it to function as a hedging feature, redirecting the conversation away from a particular 
topic. Secondarily, the discourse marker can also function as a linguistic filler to allow 
my participants to organize their thoughts. Lastly, if we take the phrase at face value, it 
demonstrates a lack of familiarity, which is illustrated by a conversation with UK 
participant F below:  
AG: Are there any kind of indicators that help you identify a male Muslim, because a lot of  
what you talked about before— head coverings— seems to more apply to women? 
F: They wear head coverings as well, don’t they? They wear turbans. Yeah, they tend to  
wear head coverings as well. Are they allowed to cut their hair? I don’t think they’re 
allowed to cut their hair, are they? I don’t know. 
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During free listing tasks, participants often bemoaned their lack of knowledge concerning 
Muslim communities, culture, and history. They felt that if the task were an actual test, 
they would have failed.  
In both the UK and US, the little familiarity residents did have with Islam was 
very negative in nature. This was likely a result of lack of exposure, more identifiable 
religious dress, and behaviors perceived as being strict. Both the US and UK have 
histories of Christianity and are therefore inherently biased towards a more positive and 
comprehensive view of it in comparison to Islam. Since the initial European medieval 
encounters with Islam, understandings of it have often been images filtered through the 
perspectives of Christians rather than being influenced by actual practices and beliefs of 
Muslims (Said, 1977). These portrayals often focus on distinguishing between the 
barbaric, backward other (Muslims) and the civilized, white Westerner (Saeed, 2007). 
Cards displaying superficial characteristics pointed out in interviews as signals of Muslim 
identity, like darker skin color and traditional religious dress, were categorized as being 
more pious and less similar to self. This emphasizes the distance participants 
unconsciously placed between themselves and the Muslim community. In the UK, strong 
religious belief of any sort is out of place. In the US, strength in Christian belief is 
praised but strength in Muslim belief is discouraged. 
Muslim populations were often seen as alien and strange, but also as being 
comprised of foreign people and immigrants. Only 14 out of the 145, or 9.7% of the, 
influential Muslim figures listed in Free Listing Task Three were from the West and 
correctly identified as Muslim. In Free Listing Task Two, participants listed things like 
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“country of origin,” “more recent immigrant,” and “usually Orientals from far East” as 
defining characteristics of Muslims.  
  
3. Societal Pressure  
 Participants expressed a desire to ‘just get on’ with others and to avoid subjects 
that are difficult to broach, such as this. Societal pressure also causes fear when 
interacting with the Muslim community, so as not to offend them or infringe on their 
cultural values, but also prevents speaking about them. There were 64 instances of the 
theme of societal pressure in the interviews. This was further broken down into three sub-
themes: (1) fear of interaction, which includes fear the majority population holds of 
talking to or approaching the Muslim community, or fear the Muslim population holds of 
getting a negative reaction from the majority population for expressing their identity; (2) 
neoliberalism; and (3) political correctness. 
 In interviews, many participants spoke of not knowing what was acceptable for 
interaction with the Muslim community, getting the impression from clothing that they 
do not wish to be approached, and therefore avoiding speaking to Muslims. US 
participant E talks about this below: 
E: And you wouldn’t necessarily… I would say… approach somebody like that to just, you  
know, like if you were standing next ‘em on the bus or whatever… because I think there 
would— there’s a perception that they’re dressed like that, they’re adhering to some kind 
of rules and they’re rules that we don’t know, so that’s kind of— 
AG: Afraid of like crossing the line or something 
E: Yeah. Right. Yeah. 
AG: ‘Cause you don’t know what it is. 
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E: Exactly. So kinda don’t wanna be unintentionally offensive, so you know… that might  
translate into being— you’re not being very friendly, but it’s more— I think it’s more 
like, “Oh! Maybe they’re not supposed to talk to strangers.” You know. 
One participant in the US wept near the end of our interview. She considered herself to 
be a liberal, accepting person, yet found herself experiencing fear when passing by 
Muslim women wearing coverings. 
Societal pressure was evident through analysis of card sorting task and free listing 
results as well. While participants explicitly said there are no hard and fast rules for 
Muslim identity, their card sorting results spoke to the contrary. Those superficial 
characteristics pointed out in interviews as signals of Muslim identity, like darker skin 
color and traditional religious dress, were categorized in card sorts as being more pious 
and less similar to self. Most participants found the tasks difficult, felt as if they were 
being tested, and worried about being seen as racist. During free listing, some participants 
were self-aware and said they did not want to only list radical and extremist Muslims for 
Free Listing Task Three.  
 
4. Isolation  
Muslim groups were seen as being separated spatially and culturally from the rest 
of society, isolated and not integrating enough. In interviews, there were 59 instances of 
words or phrases indicative of this theme of disparate communities. There were two sub-
themes within this: (1) participants generally described Muslim communities as being 
unintegrated and isolated in terms of geography and intergroup relations; (2) some 
described local majority populations as being closed off to outsiders and homogenous.  
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Various cultural aspects of the Muslim community were referenced by 
participants as evidence of their isolation. In the card sorting task, traditional Muslim 
dress was seen as less sociable, less British/American, and less similar to self by 
participants. While women were sorted as being more sociable than men, women in 
traditional dress were sorted as less sociable. Often participants mentioned lack of 
English skills as the reason they found Muslim groups to be unintegrated and 
unapproachable. This weighed more heavily upon Muslim women, who were described 
as essentially being uneducated wives hidden away from the male gaze with no 
motivation to learn English due to their lack of a career and lack of contribution to the 
British or American economy. Participant C elaborated on this thoroughly, explaining: 
C: Multiculturalism basically is the home culture allowing— and that’s the wrong word—  
allowing the incomers— the people who come into the country— to carry on practices— 
to encourage them to practice their own culture and what have you rather than try to 
assimilate into the home culture. Now, it shouldn’t be an either or, but they’ve over-
encouraged one versus the other. So you have the situation where particularly women 
who haven’t learned— Bangladeshi women is the one— who are not encouraged to learn 
English for example, therefore don’t have access to education and access to other social 
services and things because of the language barrier. So it’s things like that where I think 
there’s been an over-emphasis on— not deliberately ghettoizing people— that just 
happens because people tend to want to move into areas where there are other people like 
them. There’s nothing wrong with that. There has been a ghettoization but a 
balkanization in the sense that there’s no overlap. There doesn’t seem to be any marginal 
activities going on. Of course there’s lots of people trying to do this, but it’s hard— very, 
very hard. I think part of that is because of politicians encouraging multiculturalism more 
than they were encouraging efforts to integrate such that nowadays politicians are turning 
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completely on the head and are now thinking about things like you must have a certain 
proficiency in English to come and that sort of thing. From one extreme to the other. I 
don’t know about that either, but in a sense it’s a reaction to what’s happening. 
 
Participants often described Muslim communities within their local and broader 
regions as existing within niche areas, such as neighborhoods or boroughs within cities. 
In free listing, participants listed characteristics of Muslims that signaled this geographic 
and cultural disparity, for example “can tend to niche groups,” “separate,” “poor 
integration with existing communities,” “do not participate in Western socializing.” This 
is at least partly true. Muslims are geographically widely dispersed, however there is 
concentration in inner cities across the UK (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015). Tower 
Hamlets, for example, is a London borough to the east of the City of London with the 
highest proportion of Muslims in the country (34.5%), which is seven times that of 
England and Wales (UK Office for National Statistics, 2012). This could be related to 
half of Muslims residing in the most deprived areas of the UK (Muslim Council of 
Britain, 2015). 
Often participants’ only interaction with actual Muslims consisted of shopping in 
or perusing of ethnic shops within these niche communities. Appendix I contains 
photographs I took of ethnic shops in various areas throughout the UK and Western 
Europe. Often these shops are filled to the brim with stereotypical items of a multitude of 
Eastern cultures, reflecting orientalism, or an array of spices or stereotypical Eastern 
foods. These are generally the only places where people of Central Asian, Southeast 
Asian, African, or Middle Eastern descent will be found in cities other than London. 
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Some seem aimed at garnering white tourist customers via the commodification of 
traditional cultural practices and artifacts, fewer aim to serve insiders within the same 
culture, and many seem to attempt to fulfill both to maximize profits.  
If cities consist of large amounts of these sorts of stores, they can be perceived by 
majority populations as being lower class, shady, or impoverished. One bus driver who 
took students at my study abroad program to Leicester refused to drive too far into the 
city, saying that he never set foot in the town. This caused the tour group to walk several 
miles before reaching downtown and almost immediately having to board the bus back to 
our program’s campus. Leicester was specifically mentioned during my UK interviews 
many times as a local hub for Muslim populations and an especially diverse area. 
However, even it was stratified and had a town map strictly codified by race, ethnicity, 
and religion. One area was occupied primarily by immigrants and ethnic shops, the other 
by white majority populations. It is safe to assume the bus driver was referencing the 
poverty and ethnic composition of the more diverse areas of Leicester, especially when 
considering the second tour group on the bus was let off directly at their destination of an 
observatory on the other side of town aimed at serving white majority populations.  
There are exceptions to this common structure. Camden Town is unique because 
of its gentrification, hip qualities, and existence within the sphere of London, often 
described as an entirely different country within the UK (Image 2 in Appendix H is an 
example of one hip store whose customers primarily consisted of white majority 
populations). Other stores where one will often encounter those from majority Muslim 
countries usually are tourist shops, hocking items praising the location of sale that seem 
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slightly off. An example of such an item can be seen in image 14 in Appendix I. At the 
store selling this item, I found out the owner was a hopeful citizen of Spain. He 
immigrated there with a dream of getting a citizenship and passport more appealing to his 
real destination, the United States, than that of his Eastern country of origin. 
   
5. Negative ties to traditional clothing 
 As mentioned previously, traditional Muslim clothing as a whole was viewed by 
majority Western populations in a negative light. It was perceived as being boring, 
uncomfortable, unapproachable, and a threat to safety. There were 42 instances of the 
theme of negative perceptions of traditional Muslim clothing. This consisted of two 
major sub-themes: (1) negative aspects of the clothing for the wearer, such as its lack of 
individuality, unfashionable qualities, and uncomfortable qualities; and (2) negative 
aspects of the clothing for the majority populations who may have to interact with the 
wearer, such as it acting as a barrier to communication, it being a mysterious threat to 
safety, it signaling the wearer cannot be or does not want to be approached, and it simply 
not being up to snuff with the predilections and tastes of those in the West. 
 This broader bias against traditional clothing was present in card sorting task 
results. Men and women wearing traditional religious dress were categorized as being 
more pious, less sociable, less similar to self, and less British/American than those in 
Western dress. Men and women wearing more obvious or concealing traditional dress 
(such as the niqab or a shemagh scarf covering the majority of the face) were seen as 
being less trustworthy, sociable, similar to self, and British/American than those in less 
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concealing traditional dress. So, both men and women, when presented to participants in 
photos, were associated with negative characteristics based on their clothing. Women 
wearing unembellished, plain traditional clothing were sorted as more pious and less 
trustworthy, sociable, similar to self, and British/American than women in more elaborate 
or decorated traditional clothing. Women were particularly susceptible to negative 
associations based upon dress due to their traditional clothing being more prevalent and 
often more obvious to those in the West. This is also partly a result of Western 
perceptions of lack of agency, restriction, and oppression of Muslim women being 
exemplified by their clothing. 
Focus was often put on women’s clothing throughout participant interactions. 
During interviews, when speaking generally about Muslim clothing, participants seemed 
to naturally talk about women’s full coverings without prompting. In the majority of 
interviews, I had to prompt participants to speak on Muslim men’s clothing. When asked 
what they think and feel when seeing someone in a hijab, participants usually responded 
by wondering whether they were forced to do so, why they are doing so, and if they are 
safe. One participant worried the potential beauty of a woman was wasted when covered. 
When asked what it would be like to wear a head covering, UK participant A replied, “If 
I was going to rob a bank it’d be alright. I think it’d be pretty horrible really to be covered 
up like that.” My participant’s phrasing here was strong than others but it was still 
reflective of the views I generally encountered. 
Participants often related traditional clothing to a school uniform, some 
nostalgically, but always in a way to imply there was a lack of individuality and 
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expression. One participant marveled at how Muslims were able to distinguish emotions 
on each other’s faces and communicate with their beards and scarves in the way. Many 
focused on the covering as a barrier to communication, UK participant J even 
emphasizing it as a defining characteristic of Muslims in Free Listing Task Two, writing, 
“females face covered (poor communication).” Ingroup versus outgroup identification 
could be part of the explanation of this common perception. 
Kret and Gelder (2012) conducted a study wherein emotions were judged from 
faces. They found that fear was recognized better in women wearing a niqab than in 
women wearing a cap and shawl. The opposite was true for happy and sad expressions. 
This is likely a result of the common view of Muslim women as captives or victims and 
their perceived status as an outsider group. It would be more evolutionarily beneficial to 
recognize happiness and sadness within one’s insider group and fear and anger in 
outsider groups, and in the past emotion perception has been shown to be influenced by 
outgroup stereotypes and in-group favoritism (Zebrowitz, Bronstad, & Lee, 2007). This 
could help explain why participants found traditional Muslim clothing to be a barrier to 
communication, since it is a signal for someone who is part of an outgroup. However, 
race could mitigate or contribute to this as well. 
Politicians too have contributed to the fear and uncertainty surrounding white 
British citizens’ view of Muslim populations. In 2006, Jack Straw, the leader of the 
House of Commons and former Foreign Secretary, wrote in the Lancashire Telegraph 
that he asked Muslim women wearing the niqab to remove their veil when meeting in his 
office (Bartlett, 2006). His reasoning was much like that of other UK citizens: one could 
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more effectively have a face to face conversation when you could “see what they mean” 
and the veil acted as “a statement of separation,” which made relationships difficult to 
form (Dwyer, 2008, p. 140). There was worry that the niqab was representative of 
patriarchal control and was “an assertion of cultural separateness” (Dwyer, 2008, p. 140). 
 
6. Difficulty in defining groups due to aspects of globalization  
Participants often said it was difficult to make black and white distinctions 
between groups and to define them. This theme split further into three more specific sub-
themes: (1) the difficulty they experienced in defining Islam and Muslims generally 
because of the variety of Muslim belief and practice, (2) the difficulty they experienced 
in trying to identify someone they interacted with or saw as being Muslim, and (3) the 
difficulty they experienced in defining what the collective British or American identity 
was. There were 32 instances of expression of this theme throughout interviews.  
It is likely that globalization is partly at fault for this difficulty in forming clear 
definitions of and distinctions between various group identities. The specific aspects of 
globalization affecting identification here are the overall individualism of the West, the 
pervasiveness of Western culture throughout the rest of the world, and the diversity of the 
UK and US. According to Connolly (1991), “Identity requires difference in order to be, 
and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (p. 64). 
Identity, in some sense, is formed by defining what one is not. If there is difficulty in 
defining your insider group, Americans or Brits, there will similarly be difficulty in 
defining outsider groups, Muslims. It should be noted that there is often overlap between 
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the two, partly due to conversion, Ummah’s reach via the internet, and past and more 
recent diasporas. This mobility of culture and religion in the modern era is also an 
important facet of globalization and influence (Cesari 2004). This inability to secure self-
certainty could contribute to a dislike of multiculturalism, fear of cultural differences, and 
focus on assimilation. US participant C expressed this lack of group identity within 
America well: 
C: … well first of all we don’t have a homogenous sense of self, right? We have all different  
color people, all different religions, and all of that. It’s kind of where we come from even 
though we seem to be having this surge of America’s greatest, you know, what is that? 
Exactly. I don’t even like apple pie, you know? So we don’t have that good sense of what 
it is ‘cause we have so much of a sense of let’s be individuals. The average American 
could be someone walking down the street with blue hair and, you know, what makes the 
American? I feel like we have less of a very specific identity sometimes than even other 
countries do, but not all other countries. I think we tend to assume people in Europe are 
very similar— certainly western Europe. So, it’s hard to say become like us when we 
don’t even know what us is (laughs). 
In the free listing task, participants hinted at globalization in two ways, either 
indirectly or directly. There were eight instances of phrases in Free Lists One and Two 
that were directly associated with difficulty identifying groups or with globalization. 
Direct references included phrases such as: “lots of variety among beliefs, ideas”; “very 
mixed group”; “melting pot”. Figure 4.1 illustrates the indirect way participants hinted at 
the difficulty involved in distinguishing between various group identities based upon 
physical characteristics. Participant G in the UK only listed personality characteristics for 
what signals someone as being both British (item one) and Muslim (item two). However, 
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the majority of responses to Free Lists One and Two mention and focus on physical 
characteristics (i.e. clothes, ethnicity, food, etc.). 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Indirect example of theme six 
 
This is complicated further by card sorting results and ingroup-outgroup theory. 
While participants claimed during interviews to have difficulty identifying people as 
being a part of a specific nationality or religion based upon appearance, this was contrary 
to card sorting results. More abstract value judgements led to decreased ability to make 
direct comparisons in the card sorting task. It was easier for participants to think in terms 
of direct comparisons for similarity to self and how British/American they seemed. This 
is likely because these judgements could be interpreted as related to appearance more 
than morals.  
Many participants commented on how it was difficult to organize people in terms 
of religious strength and trustworthiness based on an image. They often formed a 
framework of their own to aid in organization for the trustworthiness task, focusing on 
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the eyes of the people pictured, or imagining them as a stranger they might ask for a 
favor. Participants did not create hypothetical situations, or even question the ability to 
judge based on a photograph, when it came to the ‘Britishness’ or ‘Americanness’ sorting 
task. This suggests they do hold someone in mind who appears to be Muslim, Christian, 
American, or British.  
 
Comparisons 
While the broad data patterns across the US and UK mirror each other and 
support similar conclusions, there are still differences in the way prejudice is manifested 
cross-culturally and in what cultural attitudes or practices contribute to this. This ranges 
from the typical terms employed in speaking about Muslims to the pertinent national 
political events. For example, in both countries there was an overarching theme of 
societal pressure, which entails fear of interacting with or talking about Muslims as a 
result of societal expectations. In the US, this was discussed using the phrases “political 
correctness” and a “fear of offending.” Alternately, UK participants talked about 
multiculturalism and a singularly British “desire to just get on.” These concepts are 
similar in their complexity and modern connotative meaning yet provide vital context to 
the current state of affairs in both areas. Multiculturalism has been lambasted by a 
number of conservative political leaders in the UK and become a sort of cautionary tale 
of labour party failure in an age of populism (Farage, 2015; The BBC, 2006; Wright, 
2011). Political correctness has been similarly bucked against by conservatives in the US, 
who consider it a major weakness of the opposing side. These reactions have both 
become intimately linked with conversations surrounding Muslims, immigrants, and 
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various minority identities, but exist in different political and social environments. The 
rest of this section will dissect the national idiosyncrasies and unique expressions of and 
influences on prejudice in the US and UK. 
It is apparent that there is systemic Islamophobia and discrimination against 
Muslims in the UK. This is expressed at a number of socio-structural levels: the average 
individual citizen, the political sphere, and in media representation. This is rooted firmly 
in British post-colonialism and relationships with South Asian immigrants and 
immigrants more broadly. Terrorist attacks such as the 7/7 London bombings have only 
spurred on this tension and fear of the “Other.” As Modood (2002, p. 24) explained, 
blame was placed on the perceived “cultural separatism and self-imposed segregation of 
Muslim migrants and on a ‘politically correct’ multiculturalism that had fostered 
fragmentation rather than integration and Britishness.” British citizens feel alienated 
themselves due to political failings and find it hard to identify with and understand the 
group put forth as a scapegoat— a group they often perceive as being too pious, rigid, 
traditional, sexist, violent, or standoffish.  
Citizens of the UK feel as if the Muslim community is unfamiliar in its cultural 
practices and is not making enough of an effort to assimilate, especially in a post-
“Brexit” society rebelling against the multiculturalism so emblematic of the Labour 
party’s ‘failures’. According to O’Brien,  
minority groups suffer discrimination not just based on the colour of their skin, but also based on 
cultural differences exemplified by the group’s adherence to certain norms and practices. 
Discrimination is accentuated when these norms and practices appear to be in direct opposition to 
the dominant majority way of life. (2000, p. 3-4)  
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This encapsulates the sort of discrimination South Asian Muslims face in the modern 
United Kingdom. Saeed (2007) explains this, saying: 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in particular have been represented in the media as 
separatist, insular and unwilling to integrate with wider society. Furthermore, the old stereotypical 
image of ‘Asian passivity’ has been replaced by a more militant aggressive identity that is meant 
to be further at odds with ‘British secular society’. The concept of culture clash has been 
reintroduced to imply that British Muslims are at odds with mainstream society (Ansari 2003; 
Modood 1994, 1997). (p. 453) 
This cultural difference is particularly stark to the majority British citizen when 
considering the perceived rigidity of Muslims. Muslims were described as being, “more 
regimented in the way they go about their religion” by UK participant A, and this 
sentiment was echoed in various ways by others. When trying to name all of the famous 
or influential Muslims and Christians they could think of, nearly all UK participants 
struggled to think of any, saying that faith was not something British people viewed each 
other by and that it was not something you blatantly presented to the world, especially for 
politicians. This suggests that the perception of Muslims as being heavily strict and 
highly visible in their religious practice is directly contradictory to British norms. This 
could be seen in that rigidity was the most common theme in UK interviews (34.1% of 
instances) with unfamiliarity being the second most common (26.3% of instances). This 
was not true for the US, with the two themes within US interviews being relatively 
similar in prevalence (30.5% versus 32.9%). 
The secularity of the UK could accentuate the ‘alienness’ of the Muslim 
community since they are seen as extremely religious. This was evident in free listing 
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task data, wherein UK participants delineated more qualities of those in the UK than US 
participants did for the US. However, UK participants did not repeat the US pattern of 
providing more influential Christian people than influential Muslim people. This hints at 
the secularity and nationalism of UK residents, ignorance of the Muslim faith broadly, or 
potentially political correctness holding back responses. However, the UK mirrored the 
US in that participants provided more negative influential Muslim people than negative 
influential Christian people. This suggests that the information participants are aware of 
is negative in nature and that both countries are influenced by a predominantly Christian 
history. 
The US’ history with Islam began much differently. Since the US lacked the 
extensive colonial history within predominantly Muslim countries that Europe held, it 
was successful in forming more amicable relationships with Arabs and Muslims (Gerges, 
2003). At this time, xenophobia and assimilationism, too, seemed more pointed at 
Hispanics rather than Middle Easterners or South Asians (Gerges, 2003). It was in the 
1970’s, with the Iranian revolution and other violent regional events, that America shifted 
from the strategic gaining of Middle Eastern countries’ trust to a fear of Islam (Gerges, 
2003). With this, Muslims became politicized, viewed as contradictory to the West, and 
associated with anti-American sentiments. 9/11 only worsened this. Muslims at this point 
were transformed into an image of a transnational political force. The war on terror and a 
great deal of anti-Muslim discrimination emerged out of this. 
Alongside this tumultuous history with Arab and Muslim countries, the ethnic 
composition of US Muslims is still uncertain (Pew Research Center, 2017). 41% of US 
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Muslims are classified as white by the census, however this may be an inaccurate 
appraisal of their ethnic composition (Pew Research Center, 2017). There is currently no 
way for those of Middle East or North African descent to specify their race, thus they are 
counted as white instead (Pew Research Center, 2017). Arab American advocacy groups 
are attempting to change this. 28% of US Muslims self-identify as Asian or South Asian 
and 20% as black (Pew Research Center, 2017). 58% of US Muslim adults are first 
generation immigrants, and among them, 35% are from South Asia, 25% are from the 
Middle East-North Africa region, and 23% are from the Asia-Pacific region (Pew 
Research Center, 2017).  
While the prominent position religion holds to Muslims was seen as particularly 
distinctive in the UK, traditional Muslim dress appeared to be particularly salient to 
American participants. Out of the six cards that were categorized as significantly less 
American, sociable, or similar to self by American participants, five held images of 
people wearing traditional religious dress (four Muslim, one Sikh). By contrast, all three 
of the cards sorted by UK participants as significantly less British or trustworthy than US 
participants held images of people wearing western dress. Two of them were often 
pointed out as seeming American rather than British during the card sorting tasks. In the 
UK, the isolation of Muslim communities was a more prevalent theme of interviews 
(15.5% of total instances) than negative associations tied to traditional Muslim clothing 
(7.3% of total instances). The reverse was true for the US and the two were much closer 
in prevalence (7.9% vs 8.6%). 
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 It should also be considered that while Arab and Muslim Americans tend to be 
socially conservative, they also tend to vote Democrat, because they see them as being 
more sensitive to adversity they face (Schaefer, 2010). This is perhaps unsurprising 
considering recent political developments within the US. There has been an exponential 
rise in resistance to political correctness. Much like the word multiculturalism in the UK, 
political correctness envelopes an American concept that is much more than its dictionary 
definition. It has become equated with weakness by members of right-wing groups. 
While this may not be a majority view, the repetition of such imagery (of spineless losers 
and “cucks”) by the internet is pervasive and could be having a strong influence on 
politics and social interactions generally. This lack of sensitivity is likely being 
recognized by minority groups within the US. 
 In both the US and UK there has been a rise in direct forms of prejudice against 
Muslims, for example the rise in hate crimes or general violence, as well as a continued 
presentation of more indirect prejudice, often focusing upon the cultural rather than the 
biological (Batchelor, 2018; Kishi, 2017; McGreal, 2012; Mishra, 2017; Osborne, 2017; 
Prendergast, 2017; Saeed, 2007; Sherriff, 2015; Suri & Wu, 2017; The BBC, 2005; 
Westcott, 2016; Williams, 2018). In the UK post-colonialist ties play a key role in its 
relationship with Islam and in the US a more recent focus on Muslim religious 
fundamentalists and perceived gender inequality has dramatically changed its orientation. 
For both countries, terrorism and the rise in populist anti-political correctness or anti-
multiculturalist movements have also significantly contributed to these complex 
relationships. The aspects of Islam that are particularly salient to each country differed 
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based on their individual cultures. While the US is heavily Christian and individualistic, 
the UK is more secular and often quieter about expression of faith. It follows that the US 
was particularly focused on traditional Muslim clothing, which they saw as an example of 
a lack of one of their foundational values, autonomy or individuality, and that the UK 
was more concerned with the perceived strictness of Muslims who present their religion 








Islam in the West has been treated according to two paths and forms of Western 
understanding: 1) it is filtered through predominant Christian beliefs in order to ‘tame’ it 
2) it is seen as unfamiliar and scary, therefore causing opposition (Said, 1977). In this 
research project, this dichotomy, originating with Said (1977), was evident in the national 
and local political milieu of the US and UK. White-presenting Bosnians, who positioned 
themselves as extensions of Christianity and Judaism, built a new mosque in Bowling 
Green with little resistance and a celebration involving thousands of people; but Muslims 
in Murfreesboro, who were perceived as a cultural other, were met with thousands of 
dollars in county legal fees, arson, graffiti, and religiously-motivated vandalism when 
they attempted to build a larger Islamic center (Miller, 2004; Mink, 2012; Kemph, 2012; 
Timms, 2017).  
On a larger scale, the Trump versus Hawaii case juxtaposed these two forms of 
Western understanding in its conclusion with the same basic concept at the root of both 
(Fetters, 2018). The importance of family and their remaining intact was utilized to create 
an atmosphere of empathy and argument against the ‘Muslim ban,’ but too was used to 
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argue in favor of it, saying an exemption was made within it for these cases. The latter 
succeeded. In the US and UK it seems the second approach to understandings of Islam, 
one of unfamiliarity with the ‘other’ and a resulting reaction to perceived cultural threat, 
is predominant. 
The relationship between Islam and Western society is one best characterized as a 
clash of ignorances (Asani, 2009). This clash of ignorances is manifested in two broad 
categories of Western majority populations’ prejudices towards Islam: (1) real or 
imagined cultural threats, especially dealing with oppression of women, and (2) the 
supposed political and military threat of Islam, which includes the misleading popular 
concept of a “clash of civilizations” (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). While the historical 
events, such as the Crusades, that typically define the clash of civilizations provide 
important historical context, they are also often invoked as a biased justification for the 
‘innate’ opposition of Islam and the West (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). The six themes 
drawn out in this thesis’ data analysis of individual expressions of prejudice towards 
Islam generally coincide with these categories, with cultural concerns more prevalent 
than political threat. These included: 
1. Rigidity of the Muslim community 
2. Unfamiliarity with the Muslim community 
3. Societal pressure 
4. Isolation of the Muslim community 
5. Negative ties to traditional Muslim clothing 
6. Difficulty in defining groups due to aspects of globalization 
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This then provides a useful framework for Western majority populations’ attitudes 
towards Islam. Both the UK and US fit well within this framework. However, the 
manifestation of these ideas orally and verbally differed between the two countries due to 
different socio-political influences. 
 In both the US and UK, it is important to keep in mind that one way identity is 
expressed is by defining what one is not when evaluating the conception of Muslim 
identity by those not of Islamic faith (Connolly, 1991). Participants seem to consciously 
struggle with distinguishing between and defining group identities due to societal 
pressure and globalization. Yet, participants at least unconsciously view the Muslim 
culture and faith in a negative light. They are then by contrast simultaneously defining 
themselves, as non-Muslims, as good. Symbolic racism then stems from this internal 
conception of difference, bolstered by lack of familiarity with the Muslim community, 
past historical images of Islam, and fictional and journalistic media depictions of 
Muslims as savage and backwards (Gerges, 2003; Lishaug & Strabac, 2008; Said, 1977; 
Shaheen, 2003;).  
However, encapsulating expression of prejudice has become increasingly 
difficult. Recent political movements in both the US and UK have begun to complicate 
national norms and values surrounding prejudice. Participants spoke of a freeing of 
discourse, allowing the expression of a wider field of political, religious, and social 
beliefs. And while on the level of broader public discourse there appears to be a return to 
and a rise in assimilationism, populism, and expressions of prejudice that violate norms 
for modern racism, at the individual level, participants often fit more neatly into the 
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narrative of symbolic racism, which appears benign to enactors, but not to those acted 
upon (Brubaker, 2001; Merritt et al., 2010). This combined with moral licensing has 
resulted in further support for public officials with more abrasive approaches questioning 
the status quo. Recent terrorist events, politicization of Muslims, people of color, and 
immigrants, and a persisting perception of Western moral superiority that is rooted in 
early accounts of the Oriental ‘Other’ have all contributed to Muslims existing in a 
unique position for increased outgroup hatred in the eyes of majority populations (Saeed, 
2017; Said, 1977). The question is then, is this blunter approach to discourse about 
minorities significantly different from the symbolic racism that had once been the best 
theory for modern prejudice? This should be explored further in future research. 
Majority Western populations fear interaction with Muslim people because of 
their compounded lack of knowledge of Muslim cultural traditions and their perception of 
Islam as being strict with imperceptible rules and rite of behavior. This is more palpable 
when speaking of Muslim women who wear traditional clothing more obvious and 
condemnable to Western populations. Majority Western populations often feel protective 
over Muslim women, mourning the imagined death of their freedom (Abu-Lughod, 
2002). This, too, stems from a lack of knowledge of and interaction with Muslim groups. 
Muslim women often derive freedom from their traditional coverings. Their choice to 
cover is a willful, autonomous decision regarding expression of their faith. As Abu-
Lughod argued, “Not only are there many forms of covering, which themselves have 
different meanings in the communities in which they are used, but also veiling itself must 
not be confused with, or made to stand for, lack of agency” (2002, p. 786). Majority 
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Western populations fear Muslim men’s societally imagined violence and oppression. 
They use this, their lack of knowledge of Muslim culture, and their fear of offending 
Muslim peoples as a validation for their separatism.  
In order to keep abreast of the sea of biased perspectives on Islam, one needs to 
bridge the gap of ignorance. According to Asani (2009), the most important thing to keep 
in mind when encountering or taking part in discourse surrounding Islam is, “Which 
Islam? Whose Islam? In which context?” (p. 2). As participants acknowledged 
themselves, there are many forms of Islam and types of Islamic practices. Beyond that, 
there are a multitude of opinions regarding Islam from outsiders with varying amounts of 
foundational knowledge. Interacting with Muslim people is a direct way to better 
understand their culture and religion and to resolve the modern clash of ignorances. 
Events such as the GMCA’s Eid-ul-Fatir celebration are good examples of forms of 
recontextualization that could help promote better outgroup relationships. 
Yet, many participants’ only interactions with or knowledge of Islam derived 
from negative, sensationalized news sources and stereotype-riddled movies. They cited 
Muslim women’s perceived separatist characteristics, for example lack of English ability 
and the wearing of conservative clothing that creates a barrier to communication, as well 
as societal pressure stemming from political correctness and the fear of offending, as 
what prevented them from directly interacting with the Muslim people they do see in 
their daily lives. This was often a large facet of interviews with participants and a 
common political battle across the West (Bartlett, 2006; Dwyer, 2008). As a result, I 
intend to conduct a further study focused on this phenomenon and if non-religious and 
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VOLUNTEERS NEEDED FOR RESEARCH ON 
PERCEPTION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 
 
I am looking for white-identifying volunteers to complete a 
demographic survey, card sorts, and free lists concerning Muslim 
populations. 
 
Participants can also take part in an interview. 30 of those 
interviewed will receive a $10 or £10 gift card and all will receive 
an audio recording of their interview afterwards. 
If interested, contact Ashley Gilliam 
US Phone: 931-551-5422 






Pictures of UK Site 
 
Image 1. The more rural area of the UK site 
 











WWLR Card 1 
 
MWL Card 2 
 
WWLB Card 3 
 
WWO Card 4 
 
MWO Card 5 
 





WWD Card 7 
 
MWDM Card 8 
 

















WTHF Card 13 
 
MTTD Card 14 
 
WTL Card 15 
 
WTHS Card 16 
 
MTTM Card 17 
 








MTKM Card 19 
 
WTNF Card 20 
 
WTNS Card 21 
 





Semi-structured interview questions 
1. Tell me a little about your background.  
2. Where have you traveled before? 
3. Describe your local community? 
4. Do you think there is a large Muslim community in your local area? And what 
about the US (or UK) as a whole? 
5. Are you aware of any mosques near where you live or any previous plans to build 
one? 
6. Are there any organizations for Muslims that you are aware of? 
7. Have you ever met a Muslim person? 
8. What signals someone as being Muslim to you? 
9. How do you think the typical lifestyle of Muslims within your broader or local 
community differs from your own? 
10. What do you think and feel when you see someone wearing a hijab? 
11. Describe what modesty means to you versus someone within the Muslim 
community. 
12. How do you think treatment of women differs between those of the Muslim faith 
and those not? 




14. To what extent should Muslim groups assimilate into American (or British) 
society? 
15. Could you briefly describe what you think or know Islamic practice consists of? 
16. How did you learn what you do know about Islam and Muslims? 
17. Do you think Muslim populations face discrimination in the US (or UK)? And do 
you think it is more or less common in the local area? 






Examples of Words and Phrases Coded for Six Themes 
 
Expressed Theme Word or Phrase Coded for # of 
Instances 
1.         Rigidity Restrict/restrictive/restriction 15 
instances 
1.         Rigidity Control (within the Muslim community) 9 
instances 
1.         Rigidity Strict/stricter 8 
instances 




1.         Rigidity You should/shouldn’t (role-playing as 
Muslims speaking to their ingroup) 
3 
instances 
2. Unfamiliarity Not know/don’t know/don’t really know 








2. Unfamiliarity Strange 3 
instances 
2. Unfamiliarity Alien 3 
instances 
2. Unfamiliarity Frighten me 1 instance 
3. Societal Pressure Get on (if in reference to majority 
populations; unique to UK participants) 
8 
instances 








3. Societal Pressure Polite society wouldn’t talk about this sort 
of thing 
1 instance 
3. Societal Pressure People can’t air their feelings 1 instance 
4. Isolation Ghetto/ghettoization 4 
instances 




4. Isolation Don’t mix/not mixing 2 
instances 
4. Isolation Pocket (of Muslim people) 2 
instances 
4. Isolation Grouping (spatial groupings, areas of cities) 2 
instances 
5. Negative ties to  
traditional clothing 
Scary (in reference to coverings) 1 instance 
5. Negative ties to 
traditional clothing 
Wouldn’t approach somebody wearing that 1 instance 
5. Negative ties to 
traditional clothing 
Detrimental to the communication process 1 instance 
5. Negative ties to 
traditional clothing 
It gives me an unease 1 instance 
5. Negative ties to 
traditional clothing 
It’d be pretty horrible (in reference to 
wearing a covering) 
1 instance 
6. Difficulty 
identifying individuals & 
groups 
Blurring/blurred (in reference to 




identifying individuals & 
groups 







identifying individuals & 
groups 
What is a British accent now? 1 instance 
6. Difficulty 
identifying individuals & 
groups 
You’d have no idea (whether someone is 
Muslim or not) 
1 instance 
6. Difficulty 
identifying individuals & 
groups 








Table of individual cards sorted differently between US and UK 
 
Card Sorted Differently across 
countries 
Category sorted differently for 
Card 3 Less British (UK) 
Card 4 Less British (UK) 
Card 6 Less Trustworthy (UK) 
Card 8 Less American (US) 
Card 12 Less sociable (US) 
Card 16 Less American (US) 
Card 17 Less American (US); Less sociable (US); Less similar 
(US) 
Card 18 Less similar to self (US) 






Example quotes from interviews 
Interview Quotation 
Theme Expressed  
(in order of highest to lowest 
frequency of expression) 
“I think some of them are forced into it. It’s a bit of 
each. I think some are forced into it and I think 
some of them, because of the way their religion 
tells them that they’ve got to cover up and they just 
follow the religion, you know. And I also think that 
a lot of it is to do with the family saying oh, you 
know, “you shouldn’t go out. You shouldn’t be 
seen. You shouldn’t have people looking at you” 
sort of thing, so that’s why they cover up.”  
— UK male interviewee, September 18, 2016 
1. Perceived rigidity of Muslim 
community 
a. Restricted 
"My guess would be that the stereotype is ‘gonna 
be from the extreme side of things. Where Muslims 
are crazy devout, willing to blow themselves up for 
their religion, they all think that if they martyr 
themselves that they’ll go to heaven and have 99 
virgins, and are slightly crazy. That all the men are 
1. Perceived rigidity of Muslim 
community 
a. Restricted 
                i. Men free and women  




abusive and shackle their wives and make them 
wander around in ridiculous outfits that nobody can 
really see anything of them and it must be difficult 
to operate in. *laughs* That’s my fear that is the 
image that comes to mind in most Americans’ 
heads when they think Muslim as opposed to, you 
know, a liberal 20 something Muslim girl who lives 
in Lebanon is college educated and prays at her 
mosque but isn’t shackled to her faith." 
— US male interviewee, March 29, 2017 
“You know, they have a very, very almost like a 
strict code of conduct if you challenge or ask an 
open question around, “Why do you do that?”, the 
answer typically is, “because that’s how it’s done”. 
There’s less of a discussion, less openness to have a 
discussion around why— just accept it.”  
— UK female interviewee, October 23, 2016 
1. Perceived rigidity of Muslim 
community 
      b.   Strict 
“Muslims yes they have a very in certain 
countries—not all—but in certain countries. The 
worst is like Saudi Arabia from what my friends 
have told me who have been there. Saudi Arabia 
1. Perceived rigidity of Muslim 
community 
      b.   Strict 
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doesn’t have a big problem with terrorism, because 
all their terrorists leave and come here or go to 
other countries and start shit, so yeah. They have a 
more devout way men and women dress than 
Christian countries.” 
— US male interviewee, July 9, 2017 
“A lot of what I said is based on a stereotypical 
kind of thinking that Muslims eat curry and stuff 
like that. It’s all stereotypical isn’t it? And based on 
people not quite knowing all the facts. I feel very 
ignorant about their beliefs and all the different 
headdresses and just their way of life really. It’s 
just, I’m just making judgements on assumptions 
because I haven’t done any kind of research about 
it.”  
— UK female interviewee, November 10, 2016 
2. Unfamiliarity of Islam/Muslim 
community 
a. Ignorance 
“Um, I know Ramadan is like a month long or— 
and it’s not— like our Easter’s the same time— 
roughly the same time every year, but— or 
Christians’ Easter is roughly the same time every 
year, but for some, they must— I don’t know if it’s 
2. Unfamiliarity of Islam/Muslim 
community 
a. Ignorance  
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on— being on a different calendar— I don’t 
understand how they know when Ramadan is but I 
know it’s not the same time every year. Um, and 
they fast most of the day, maybe eat at night… 
Let’s see… I mean I know Muhammad’s the… the 
prophet the… I don’t know if he’s like Jesus and 
supposed to be like synonymous with God or if 
he’s just the last greatest prophet. I forget. 
Um…  that’s all I can think of.” 
— US female interviewee, April 13, 2017 
“I mean if they’re a recent immigrant then they’re 
different because they’re just getting their lives 
restarted in a new land and there’s some issues with 
learning customs, potentially learning a language, 
just logistics of being in a new place, getting a new 
driver’s license, car, place to live, your kids to 
school, and all that stuff. I don’t know that you can 
really attribute that to their faith. It’s more just 
because, well, they’re immigrant.”  
— US male interviewee, March 29, 2017  
2. Unfamiliarity of Islam/Muslim 
community 
      b.   Alienness 
                 i.      Muslim =  




“And certainly in the case of an English Anglican 
church, you probably expect to go to church once a 
week on a Sunday, if you were devout I believe 
possibly to one other service, whereas for a lot of 
Muslims I know that you’re talking about regular 
services and things happening regularly during the 
day— prayers need to be said at certain times and 
places, etcetera, and those things are quite 
distinctive and I think they add to the what you 
might call strangeness to people who are 
indigenous to Britain, you know.”  
— UK male interviewee, November 12, 2016 
2. Unfamiliarity of Islam/Muslim 
community 
      b.   Alienness 
                ii.      Different 
“And you wouldn’t necessarily… approach 
somebody like that”… “because I think there 
would— there’s a perception that they’re dressed 
like that, they’re adhering to some kind of rules and 
they’re rules that we don’t know.”  
— US female interviewee, April 13, 2017 
3. Societal Pressure 
      b.   Afraid on both sides 
              i.     Majority  
                     population  
                     fearful 
 
1. Perceived rigidity of Muslim 
community 
      b.   Strict 
“But if they’re not immigrant, then I wouldn’t think 
that they would be much different than I am. They 
might be very careful about speaking about their 
3. Societal Pressure 
      b.   Afraid on both sides 
              ii.     Muslim  
                     population  
                     fearful 
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faith because of prejudice that might come their 
way, but aside from that I think they would be 
really like everybody else." 
— US male interviewee, March 29, 2017 
 
“If you’re behaving in a way that’s like you give 
even just visually the person that you don’t want 
somebody to come near you, you know, that would 
be a barrier too. But that could be for any number 
of reasons— fear of how they’re going to be 
treated, you know that sort of stuff so… I’m sure I 
give off the same vibe when I feel nervous or 
uncomfortable and obviously— not obviously but I 
feel like a lot times that feeds off of each other. 
They seem nervous then I get nervous then we’re 
both nervous and we’re like “oh”. (laughter)” 
— US female interviewee, March 28, 2017 
3. Societal Pressure 
      b.   Afraid on both sides 
              i.     Majority  
                     population  
                     fearful 
             ii.     Muslim  
                     population  
                     fearful 
 
“Brexit has also brought it out. It was very difficult 
to talk about this subject. You’re obviously aware 
of that because of the way you’re phrasing this. 
Polite society wouldn’t talk about this sort of thing. 
3. Societal pressure 




And you certainly weren’t allowed to talk about it. 
Politicians wouldn’t talk about it.”  
— UK male interviewee, October 7, 2016 
“You know? You’re with me. You know what I 
mean. It’s hard to describe it to a young lady like 
you. I could do it quite easy talking to [indistinct] 
or one of the others, you know. We use, uh, explicit 
words...” 
— UK male interviewee, September 18, 2016 
3. Societal pressure 
a. Political correctness 
“Most of them— most of the communities do. 
They keep their selves to their selves. But I think 
they should all learn English, make it compulsory 
to learn English, and get on with the people that are 
in your area. It’s part and parcel of it. I mean, I 
have no problems with anybody at all. I get on with 
everyone. Well, try to anyway.”  
— UK male interviewee, September 18, 2016 
4. Isolation and lack of 
integration of Muslim 
community 
a. Not integrated 
 
3. Societal pressure 
a. Political correctness 
“They just don’t wanna assimilate is their biggest 
problem. They don’t wanna understand it. You 
come here, you love your neighbor, you assimilate 
4. Isolation and lack of 
integration of Muslim 
community 
a. Not integrated 
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into American culture, you’re not gonna impose 
your silly stuff from your last country. Sorry. It’s 
just not how it is. That’s the biggest thing that they 
have going against them.” 
— US male interviewee, July 9, 2017 
“I do feel that sometimes the Muslim group needs 
to challenge itself— needs to integrate more and I 
think that’s a really difficult thing to ask because in 
many ways the faith is one which wants, I think, to 
be pervasive and it believes it’s right, as most faiths 
do.”  
— UK male interviewee, November 12, 2016 
4. Isolation and lack of 
integration of Muslim 
community 
a. Not integrated 
“All the politicians over the years have encouraged 
multiculturalism. On a political level it’s something 
I don’t like. And I think I’m justified in that now 
when you see the result of it, which is ghettos and 
groups of people who don’t mix and we see that a 
lot in the UK. You can go to parts of Leicester for 
example, which is diverse if you look at Leicester’s 
statistics as a whole, but you’ll find this group here, 
that group there, etc.”  
4. Isolation and lack of 
integration of Muslim 
community 
a. Not integrated 
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— UK male interviewee, October 7, 2016 
“Yeah. Like if all the sudden people just started 
like very obviously doing like praying five times a 
day and doing all that people would definitely here 
be like, “what is going on? This is super weird. 
Why is this happening?” ‘Cuz since it is such a 
more insular like, “we are over here,” kind of 
thing.” 
— US female interviewee, April 9, 2017  
4. Isolation and lack of 
integration of Muslim 
community 
a. Not integrated 
[on communicating to someone wearing a veil] 
“It’s like being on the end of a telephone.”  
— UK male interviewee, October 7, 2016 
5. Negative ties associated with 
traditional Muslim clothing 
a. Coverings bad for others 
i. Communication 
[on what it’d be like to wear a form of covering] “If 
I was going to rob a bank it’d be alright. I think it’d 
be pretty horrible really to be covered up like that.”  
— UK male interviewee, September 18, 2016 
5. Negative ties associated with 
traditional Muslim clothing 
a. Coverings bad for others 
ii. Safety 
“Unless they approach me, I don’t feel like I 
should. And maybe if it’s a woman I’d probably be 
safer to do so. But I feel like the clothing says this 
is where everything stops. So I don’t know what is 
5. Negative ties associated with 
traditional Muslim clothing 
a. Coverings bad for others 
    ii.     Unapproach—  
            able 
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the appropriate way to approach someone who is 
dressed in that manner. But if it’s like, you know, 
headscarf in the hair but not covering the face, that 
feels more open and then I can tell from facial 
expressions I can approach that person or not— 
that kind of a thing. I think. So, I do think the full 
body covering type of clothing is definitely a 
barrier, but I don’t know that just modest, like a 
headscarf or something like that is necessarily.” 
— US female interviewee, March 28, 2017 
“Um, (laughing) that’s a funny question ‘cause 
sometimes I think if I could just wear a uniform 
every day my life would be so much easier. 
(laughing) Um, I think it would be fairly restrictive 
feeling. Um, uncomfortable… hot… um… and I 
think it would feel like a barrier… um.. Yeah.” 
— US female interviewee, April 13, 2017 
5. Negative ties associated with 
traditional Muslim clothing 
a. Coverings bad for 
wearers 
    iii.    Uncomfortable 
“So I don’t think there’s an absolute hard and fast 
set of consistent cues that you can go, “that person 
is a Muslim.””  
— UK female interviewee, October 23, 2016 
6. Difficulty identifying 
individuals in specific groupings 




“I mean, one of the amusing things about this 
country is that we have quite strong accents in 
relatively small areas and very often if you were to 
listen to someone on the radio, you’d have no idea 
whatsoever whether they were English or Muslim 
or whatever because they’ve perhaps grown up in 
somewhere like Yorkshire where there’s a very 
strong accent and it’s only when you actually see 
them that you think, “Oh, crikey, that’s not a white 
yorkshireman. That’s a guy wearing a funny hat or 
a woman in a burqa,” you know, but actually 
they’re speaking in a Yorkshire accent. And that’s 
because, as I say, we’ve got on to second third and 
more generations now and I mean you get people 
with very strong Glasgow accents.”  
— UK male interviewee, November 12, 2016 
6. Difficulty identifying 
individuals in specific groupings 
a. Hard to identify if person 
is Muslim 
 
“But I think it is unreasonable to— well first of all 
we don’t have a homogenous sense of self, right? 
We have all different color people, all different 
religions, and all of that. It’s kind of where we 
come from even though we seem to be having this 
6. Difficulty identifying 
individuals in specific groupings 





surge of America’s greatest, you know, what is 
that? Exactly. I don’t even like apple pie, you 
know? So we don’t have that good sense of what it 
is ‘cause we have so much of a sense of let’s be 
individuals. The average American could be 
someone walking down the street with blue hair 
and, you know, what makes the American? I feel 
like we have less of a very specific identity 
sometimes than even other countries do, but not all 
other countries. I think we tend to assume people in 
Europe are very similar— certainly western 
Europe. So it’s hard to say become like us when we 
don’t even know what us is.” 
— US female interviewee, March 28, 2017 
“Because they are so restricted when they can show 
it off, but, you know, it depends on the 
environment I’m sure. And again like everybody 
else you’ve got this huge spectrum. You can’t 
expect millions of people to all behave exactly the 
same. We don’t manage it over here. And there are 
other countries that are more committed to 
6. Difficulty identifying 
individuals in specific groupings 





community and religion I think as a whole, but still. 
Get any five people from anywhere in the room and 
see if they can agree on anything— like dinner 
even.” 







Bookshop Material Culture 
 
Image 1. A section of a London bookshop dedicated to books on the East with multiple 




Image 2. A section of the same London bookshop as image 1 filled with books written in 
Arabic 
 
Image 3. One shelf of books focused on Islam in Blackwell’s bookshop in Oxford, UK; 




Images 4. & 5. books from a local, smaller book store in Nottingham, UK displaying and 








Contextual Photos of Ethnic Shops 
 
Image 1. Street view of an ethnic shop sandwiched between a shoe store and tattoo shop 






























Image 10. & Image 11. of the inside of the Cambridge, UK ethnic shop and of the inside 





Image 12. The front area of the Turkish dessert shop in Cork, Ireland 
 





Image 14. An odd item for sale in a Barcelona, Spain tourist shop run by a recent 
immigrant 
 
